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WORSE THAN PIRATES OR PRUSSIAN
CHANCELLORS: A STATE’S AUTHORITY TO
OPT-OUT OF THE QUID PRO QUO
Michael C. Duff*
Privatization of public law dispute resolution in workplaces
has been under intense scrutiny in the context of arbitration.
Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently
underway, or under serious consideration, in several states. In
connection with state workers’ compensation statutes, one state
has implemented, and others are considering, a dispute resolution
model in which employers are explicitly authorized to “opt out” of
coverage. “Alternative benefit plans,” created under such
statutes, permit employers to, among other things, unilaterally
and without limitation designate private fact-finders, whose
conclusions are subject to highly deferential judicial review. This
model is arbitration on steroids. While there may be doubts in
some quarters about the neutrality of arbitrators, reasonable
doubts about the loyalties of an employer-appointed fact-finder
are inevitable. Such a design would mark a decisive break with
the quid pro quo/Grand Bargain of the early twentieth century,
and there is a risk of some states getting caught up in a “race to
the bottom,” where states not recognizing a right to a remedy for
physical injury become havens of low-cost labor, and thus exert
pressure on states that safeguard traditional rights to follow suit.
In response to this newest wave of innovation, the Supreme
Court may be forced to intimate an opinion on the constitutional
right to a remedy for personal, and especially physical, injury
(whether within or outside of the workplace). The Court has not
squarely addressed the issue since 1917, when it decided New
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York Cent. R. Co. v. White, a case originally upholding the
constitutionality of workers’ compensation systems. In White, the
Court hinted, but did not clearly establish, that the right to a
remedy for physical injury may not be abolished without
substitution of a reasonable remedy.
Workers’ compensation opt out is in reality part of a larger
discussion about “tort reform.” This article discusses various
theories of restraint of state legislatures implementing reforms in
personal injury remedies. Ultimately the article concludes that
the judiciary should apply heightened scrutiny when considering
constitutional challenges to significant reforms of such remedies.
No civilized society would subject significant legislative
reductions to remedies for personal injury to merely cursory
judicial review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Privatization1 of public law dispute resolution in workplaces
has been under intense scrutiny in recent years, most frequently
in the context of arbitration.2 Whether one agrees or disagrees
with compulsory arbitration of workplace claims, its existence is
no longer remarkable.3 Yet, it might be surprising to some that
compulsory arbitration has expanded beyond workplace disputes
to tort claims and personal injury actions. A close reading of the
Supreme Court’s startling4 2012 opinion in Marmet Health Care
Center v. Brown,5 in which the Court announced, in a per curiam
opinion, that personal injury and wrongful death suits are covered
by the Federal Arbitration Act,6 suggests that the scope of
arbitration will likely expand.7 As important as the policies and
values inherent in employment law may be, the law of personal
1. U.S.
EEOC,
NOTICE
NO.
915.002
(July
10,
1997),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html (“1. SUBJECT: Policy Statement on
Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition of Employment.”) (arguing that compulsory arbitration privatizes
governmental anti-discrimination enforcement).
2. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatizationof-the-justice-system.html?_r=1.
3. See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 7-9 (2013).
4. Readers, believing that people entering into arbitration agreements read or
understand what they are entering into, may not have been startled by the opinion.
Others might have sympathy with the West Virginia Supreme Court’s view that “as a
matter of public policy under West Virginia Law, an arbitration clause in a nursing
home admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results
in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a
dispute concerning the negligence.” Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,
724 S.E.2d 250, 292 (W. Va. 2011), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr. v.
Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).
5. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
6. Id. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) federalizes agreements to arbitrate.
If a court concludes that such an agreement exists, it will, as a matter of federal law,
enforce it and dismiss, or hold in abeyance court suits filed on the merits of disputes
even arguable within the agreement’s ambit. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991).
7. Marmet Health, 132 S. Ct. at 1203 (“The statute’s text includes no exception
for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain
of the parties to arbitrate.’”) (internal citation omitted). It is worth noting that the
American Bar Association has taken a formal position against the type of pre-injury
waivers of wrongful death claims that were at issue in Marmet. See ABA Comm’n on
Law and Aging, Rep. 111B (2009) (adopted by the House of Delegates Feb. 16, 2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2009_my_111b.authc
heckdam.pdf.
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injury is older, even ancient.8 Tort values are difficult to square
with notions of arbitration contracts or of the waiver of rights in
employment or commercial contexts.9 A requirement that an
employee—or anyone—must compromise the right to a personal
injury lawsuit before understanding the nature or extent of a
subsequently suffered injury is disquieting. The American
Arbitration Association has frequently declined to conduct
arbitrations based on pre-injury agreements to arbitrate medical
malpractice cases.10 Even during the peak of industrialism, not
far removed in time from Lochner, some late nineteenth century
courts refused to enforce pre-injury waivers of tort suits—the
exclusive cause of action for workplace injury prior to the early
twentieth century—by employees against their employers.11
Another kind of workplace dispute privatization is presently
underway in several states.12 In connection with century-old
workers’ compensation laws—the successors to tort laws and
especially to the law of negligence13—one state has
implemented,14 and others are considering,15 a dispute resolution
model in which employers are authorized to opt out of coverage by
workers’ compensation statutes. “Alternative benefit plans,”

8. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century
Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1127, 1128 (1990):
Judges from the seventeenth century in England to the nineteenth
century in the United States expressed in their tort decisions the
same policies, the same values, and the same principles. They used
tort law to make people behave in morally appropriate ways by
holding them to community standards of reasonable behavior in the
circumstances in order to minimize injuries and losses, and to
promote honesty and fairness in economic relationships. In certain
kinds of cases, these principles led judges to hold defendants strictly
liable.
Id.
9. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 253, 273
(2004) (“At the extreme, unrestrained enforcement of arbitration clauses could make
all tort policy considerations disappear altogether”).
10. Crossman v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 738 S.E.2d 737, 739 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013);
Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, 759 S.E.2d 727, 730 (S.C. 2014).
11. Johnson v. Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 29 A.854 (Pa. 1894).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III. B.
15. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to
Ditch
Workers’
Comp,
PROPUBLICA,
Oct.
14,
2015,
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workerscomp [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes].
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created under opt-out statutes,16 permit employers to, among
other things, designate private workers’ compensation fact
finders,17 whose findings of fact are subjected to highly deferential
judicial review.18 This model is arbitration on steroids. While
there may be doubts in some quarters about the neutrality of
arbitrators,19 reasonable doubts about the loyalties of an
employer-appointed fact-finder are inevitable.20
Preliminarily, it might be argued that an employer’s opting
out of coverage by a workers’ compensation statute is acceptable
if employees have knowingly signed pre-injury waivers of
workers’ compensation benefits. Leaving to one side whether
such a waiver would ever tend to be knowing, experience in Texas
(the largest opt-out state)21 has shown that employers frequently
make no attempt to have their employees sign waivers.22
Workers’ compensation law generally limits employees to
workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of tort damages for
personal injuries suffered in the workplace, a principle known as
“the exclusive remedy rule.”23 In states that retain the exclusive
remedy rule and that allow employers to opt-out of the workers’
16. TEX. LAB. CODE. ANN. § 406.002 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A §§ 3,
202 (West 2015).
17. See Oklahoma Injury Benefit Act, which states:
The claimant may appeal in writing an initial adverse benefit
determination to an appeals committee within one hundred eighty
(180) days following his or her receipt of the adverse benefit
determination. The appeal shall be heard by a committee consisting
of at least three people that were not involved in the original
adverse benefit determination. The appeals committee shall not
give any deference to the claimant’s initial adverse benefit
determination in its review.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 211(B)(1) (West 2015). Thus, the employer may appoint
as fact finder any three individuals who “were not involved in the original adverse
benefit determination.”
18. See infra Part III. B.
19. See generally Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (2011).
20. “Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable, but ‘our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’”
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
21. See infra Part III. A.
22. Although dated, figures from 2001 showed that only about seven percent of
opt-out employers required their employees to sign waivers. Joseph Shields & John
Schnautz, Litigation Trends and the Use of Liability Waivers by Nonsubscribing
Employers, 6:4 TEXAS MONITOR (Winter 2001) (RESEARCH & OVERSIGHT COUNCIL ON
WORKERS’
COMP.,
TEX.
DEP’T
INS.),
available
at
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/wcreg/mon6-4waiver.html.
23. MICHAEL C. DUFF, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 326 (2013).
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compensation system, employees of opt-out employers are left
with no legal remedy for workplace injury. Admittedly, employees
acquiescing to mandatory arbitration of other employment claims
are often in similar straits.24 However, workers’ compensation
opt-out potentially leaves employees even more vulnerable,25
because of the possible scope and magnitude of injury claims,26
and because of employers’ legally-conferred discretion to choose
dispute fact finders.27
This Article discusses both opt-out and a type of incremental
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits transpiring in some
states.28 More broadly, this article concerns “tort reform.” At
times, this article discusses, interchangeably, state legislative
remedial limitations of tort and workers’ compensation because
the two bodies of law each concern state law remedies for
personal, and especially physical, injury.29 Thus, while this
article is about the somewhat novel workers’ compensation optout phenomenon, it is more broadly about the authority of states
to curtail the right to a remedy for personal injury. The question
has come up repeatedly in recent decades in contexts such as “tort
reform,”30 “medical malpractice reform,”31 and the application of
state statutes of repose to bar tort claims.32 In short, the question
of the limits of state interference with tort remedies comes up
whenever legislatures attempt to decrease plaintiff tort
compensation.33 Virtually the same questions are implicated by
24. As a practical matter, there is almost no substantive judicial review of an
arbitration award. 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 9-11 (2008).
25. For an excellent introduction to opt-out, see Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15.
26. In 2014, private industry reported three million nonfatal workplace injuries
and illnesses, a rate of roughly 3.2 cases per 100 full-time workers. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses—2014
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/osh.pdf.
27. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. In Texas and Oklahoma
employers are able to combine opt-out with arbitration. See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See, e.g., infra Part IV. A.
30. Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 795 (Or. 1995) (upholding $500,000 statutory
cap on awards of noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions on theory that
plaintiff had received a substantial remedy).
31. Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 829 (N.H. 1980) (striking several provisions
modifying tort law as applied to medical malpractice); see infra Part IV. C.
32. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 319-20 (N.D. 1986).
33. Typical legislative reforms have included measures capping damages and
attorney fees, adopting shortened statutes of limitations or statutes of repose,
increasing the difficulty of certifying class actions, mandating bifurcation or other
means of restructuring trials, narrowing standards of liability, providing for close
judicial review of jury findings, abolishing or limiting joint and several liability, and
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workers’ compensation reform because workers’ compensation
rights have been, from their inception, explicitly derived from tort
rights.34 Workers’ compensation claimants stand in the historical
shoes of torts plaintiffs.35 Generally speaking, opt-out implicates
the complete elimination of a right to a remedy for workplace
injury,36 while the incremental erosion of rights concerns the
adequacy of benefits.37 Debates over tort reform often involve tort
caps, especially caps of noneconomic damages,38 which is a
question of adequacy. Workers’ compensation benefits do not
allow for the possibility of noneconomic benefits,39 and while it
would be rare in the course of a tort reform debate for someone to
propose that the amount of a plaintiff’s damages be within the
exclusive control of a tort defendant, in essence, that is what optout permits.40
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II provides
abolishing the collateral source rule. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J.
524, 527 (2005).
34. Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the
Tort System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’
Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985).
35. Tort reform has come in waves.
In the first wave of retrenchment, businesses sought changes in
rules of law, but . . . the general public, more so than courts, were
the target of the efforts at persuasion. . . . In the mid-80s, a second
wave of increased insurance premiums hit multiple sectors,
including the automotive and health care industries. . . . As in the
1970s, state legislatures responded to a rapid rise in liability
insurance rates by enacting measures that capped pain and
suffering damages, limited punitive damages, restricted the
collateral source rule, and modified or eliminated joint and several
liability rules. In 1986 alone, forty-one of forty-six state legislatures
enacted some type of tort reform measure. . . . The effort to
nationalize tort law can be seen as a “third wave” of tort
retrenchment.
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of
Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1029-32 (2005).
36. Texas, as will be seen is the exception. See infra Part III. A. Unlike Oklahoma,
opt-out employers in Texas are liable in tort. As a practical matter, the tort right in
Texas is eviscerated by compulsory arbitration. See infra Part III. B. Thus, it is the
combination of opt-out and arbitration that has, practically speaking, killed workers’
tort rights in Texas.
37. See infra Part III. C.
38. See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40. The existing structures provide either for payment of the same “forms” of
benefits (Oklahoma), or impose no duty on the employer to implement a plan with
benefits (Texas). See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
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workers’ compensation history and context to assist with
contextualizing legislative workers’ compensation benefit
reduction initiatives, including opt-out. Part III describes the
roiling workers’ compensation backdrop in three states; Subparts
A and B address Texas and Oklahoma, presently the only states
with enacted opt-out statutes,41 thereby representing the most
dramatic break to date with the historical workers’ compensation
mode. Subpart C examines Florida, a state that has allegedly
incrementally eroded its workers’ compensation benefits to the
point where the benefits are unreasonable or inadequate.42 Part
IV of this Article discusses the prospect of restraining state “tort
reform” through “right to remedy,”43 “open courts,”44 or “quid pro
quo”45 provisions in state constitutions. Part V concludes by
discussing the possibility of restraining states through operation
of federal due process principles first articulated by the Supreme
Court in its seminal 1917 opinion in New York Cent. R. Co. v.
White,46 a case originally upholding the constitutionality of the
American workers’ compensation model.47 Part V argues that
White may have been employing an early form of historical due
process analysis. The argument contends that, even if White
cannot be comprehended within the Supreme Court’s historical
due process modalities, principles of “structural due process” and
“Lockean provisos” compel a conclusion that our legal order
should find repugnant inadequate remedies for negligentlycaused physical injury or for accidental injury comprehended
within the historical workers’ compensation “grand bargain.”48
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ESSENTIAL HISTORY AND
PRESENT CONTEXT
The essential theory of workers’ compensation law is
straightforward. When a worker is injured, compensation is
swiftly and, more or less, automatically provided according to
41. See infra Parts III. A., III. B.
42. See, e.g., Stahl v. Hialeah Hospital, 160 So.3d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015),
rev granted, 2015 WL 6126944 (challenging as unconstitutional requirement that
injured workers contribute to medical expense occasioned by work-related injury).
43. See infra Part IV. A.
44. See infra Part IV. A.
45. See infra Part IV. B.
46. 243 U.S. 188, 207-09 (1917); accord Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249
U.S. 152, 162-63 (1919).
47. White, 243 U.S. at 209.
48. See infra Part V. A.
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some pre-existing measure or schedule of benefits.49 This idea is
not new. In roughly the last third of the seventeenth century, the
governing articles of Captain Morgan’s great pirate ships allowed
that buccaneers wounded and maimed on voyages—presumably
while plundering fat Spanish galleons—would be compensated
according to a schedule of listed harms.50 These were early
glimmerings of the emergence of a workers’ compensation
insurance “system.” By the nineteenth century, Otto von
Bismarck had become an adherent of the view that workers
injured in the course of employment ought to be compensated
efficiently and humanely.51 Bismarck’s views were admittedly
offered in the service of Christendom and born of a fierce
opposition to socialism and communism;52 nevertheless, they were
not what a contemporary person might expect from the chancellor
of “blood and iron.”53 The ideal of workers’ compensation caught
on across the then-industrializing late nineteenth century world,
and had spread to the United States by 1910.54 The rudimentary
concept was that negligence lawsuits would be “exchanged” for
statutorily pre-determined benefits.55 Workers with viable
negligence claims would probably receive less compensation
under a workers’ compensation statute than they might have in
tort.56 But, on average, many more workers were likely to receive
some compensation for work-related injuries under workers’
compensation statutes than in negligence suits.57 In negligence,
workers were frequently defeated by affirmative defenses and

49. Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993).
50. STEPHEN TALTY, EMPIRE OF BLUE WATER: CAPTAIN MORGAN’S GREAT PIRATE
ARMY, THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAS, AND THE CATASTROPHE THAT ENDED THE
OUTLAW’S BLOODY REIGN 58-59 (2007); N.Y. STATE WORKERS’ COMP. BD., CENTENNIAL
7 (2014) (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA (1678)
(translated by Alexis Brown)), http://www.wcb.ny.gov/WCB_Centenial_Booklet.pdf.
51. Otto von Bismarck, Practical Christianity, in 20 THE GERMAN CLASSICS 221,
228 (1914), http://www.unz.org/Pub/FranckeKuno-1913v10-00221.
52. A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman 57 (1967).
53. Id.
54. Commentators typically reference the year 1910 as the beginning of the
workers’ compensation reception period, though it is difficult to fix the date with
precision. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & Econ. 305, 305-06
(1998) [hereinafter Fishback & Kantor].
55. Fishback & Kantor, supra note 54 at 305-06..
56. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN E. KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE:
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 4 (2000) [hereinafter FISHBACK & KANTOR,
A PRELUDE].
57. Id.
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ultimately received no compensation58—an outcome made much
less likely through passage of workers’ compensation statutes.
By 1917, the Supreme Court had held that a state legislature
(New York’s) could permissibly substitute workers’ compensation
benefits for tort remedies, provided that the substitution was not
“repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”59
The Court was careful to emphasize that it did not have before it
a case in which a state was attempting to “suddenly set aside all
common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and
employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.”60 The
substitute deemed adequate was payment to an injured worker of
wage-loss indemnity benefits, payment for surgical and medical
treatment associated with a workplace injury, and, in the event of
work-related death, payment of funeral expenses and wage-loss
benefits to the worker’s surviving family.61 The Court also
recognized that the system would be operated by a public, state
administrative commission.62 These features, therefore, were
implicitly deemed to be a reasonable substitute for a tort suit.
At the present moment in history, the continued viability of
the workers’ compensation tort substitute, the quid pro quo,
endorsed by White, is in question. The two poles of argument in
constant operation will be familiar to many readers. On the one
hand, it might be argued that workers’ compensation laws are
tantamount to “ordinary” common law rules, modifiable at will by
a rational legislature.63 On the other hand, it might be contended
that the transition to workers’ compensation, a socially massive
undertaking involving historically important remedies for
personal injury, would not have been acceptable in the absence of
a widespread understanding that substitute benefits under the
system could continue to be available and “reasonable.”64
This quid pro quo debate is perplexing but not academic.

58. Affirmative defenses that became known as the “unholy trinity”: assumption
of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule. See DUFF, supra note
23, at 371.
59. White, 243 U.S. at 208. The logical corollary, of course, is that such a
substitution could be repugnant.
60. Id. at 201. The logical corollary is that such a sudden set-aside without a
“reasonably just substitute” could be problematic, though on what Fourteenth
Amendment theory readily applicable in 1917 is not clear.
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id. at 194.
63. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 144 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
64. See generally Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001); see
infra Part IV.
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Some state legislatures seem poised to authorize wholesale
substitution of employer-created alternative benefit plans for
workers’ compensation remedies.65 Oklahoma has already done
so.66 Apart from opt-out, other states have demonstrated a
willingness to allow significant modifications of workers’
compensation rights by reducing the amount or duration of
medical and wage-loss indemnity benefits.67 Oklahoma’s abrupt
embarkation on the opt-out route instantly generated litigation.68
On the other hand, over time, Florida has made significant but
incremental reductions to its workers’ compensation benefits,
provoking periodic litigation resistance.69 The Florida model of
incremental erosion is not unique. The Demolition of Workers’
Comp,70 a recent and much-discussed article produced jointly by
ProPublica and National Public Radio, contends that, “[o]ver the
past decade, state after state has been dismantling America’s
workers’ comp system with disastrous consequences for many of
the hundreds of thousands of people who suffer serious injuries at
work each year.”71
On the contemporary opt-out front, the popular press has
reported that a corporate-funded lobbying group, the Association
for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ Compensation
(“ARAWC”), stated that “the corporations ultimately want to
change workers’ comp laws in all 50 states.”72 On its website, the
ARAWC discusses Tennessee as a state in which opt-out is
actively under construction.73 An “Employee Injury Benefit
65. See Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15; see also supra note 16.
66. See infra Part III. B.
67. Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between
Work-Related Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 55 AM. J.
INDUS. MED. 487, 498-502 (2012) (discussing benefit reductions and other obstacles to
employee pursuit of legitimate workers’ compensation claims).
68. See infra Part III. B.; see generally Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013).
69. See infra Part III. C.; see generally Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014
WL 6685226, at ¶ 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds).
70. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp,
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-ofworkers-compensation [hereinafter Grabell & Berkes, Demolition].
71. Id.
72. Molly Redden, Walmart, Lowe’s, Safeway, and Nordstrom Are Bankrolling a
Nationwide Campaign to Gut Workers’ Comp, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:47
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/03/arawc-walmart-campaign-againstworkers-compensation (citing Stephanie K. Jones, Group Aims to Create Alternatives
to
Workers’
Comp
State-by-State,
Ins.
Journal,
Nov.
10,
2014,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/11/10/346291.htm); see also
Grabell & Berkes, supra note 15.
73. See Tennessee Option, ASS’N FOR RESPONSIBLE ALT. TO WORKERS’ COMP.,
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Alternative” was introduced in the Tennessee Senate in 2015 but
did not pass.74 A second attempt was made in the spring of 2016,
but the bill failed, possibly due to an ethics controversy
surrounding the bill’s sponsor.75 ARAWC’s materials suggest that
it has national ambitions,76 and South Carolina appears to be the
group’s next target of opportunity.77
Observers of workers’ compensation reform acknowledge
that its overall purpose is to save businesses money.78 The
http://arawc.org/state-priorities/tennessee/ (last visited May 25, 2016).
74. See S. B. 721, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015). It is anticipated
that the bill will be reintroduced with revisions in 2016. Amy O’Connor Tennessee
Workers Comp Opt-Out Legislation Revised, Ready for Next Session, INS. JOURNAL,
June
1,
2015,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/01/370065/htm. By all
accounts, the proposed Tennessee bill is more extreme than Oklahoma’s statute.
[I]t eliminates an entire genre of benefits. Indeed, the bill’s
mandated plan benefits do not provide for any permanency benefits:
No permanent partial or permanent total benefits. It eliminates
lifetime medical benefits, capping medical at $300,000, thereby
jeopardizing treatment of workers with the most serious injuries.
Nor are there funeral benefits, nor for ancillary benefits common in
workers’ compensation systems—van and home modification,
custodial care, hearing aids, and artificial limbs.
David B. Torrey, Appendix B: Statement of the American Insurance Association:
Legislation Permitting Employer Opt-Out of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
System, Mar. 9, 2015, in The Opt-Out of Workers’ Compensation Legislation in the
Southern States, Keynote Speaker at MCLE New England: 16th Annual Workers’
Comp.
Conference
2015
(Nov.
20,
2015),
http://www.davetorrey.info/files/Torrey.MCLE._Mass_Opt-out.10.26.15final.pdf.
75. See Stephanie Goldberg, Did texting scandal derail Tennessee workers comp
opt-out
effort?,
BUS.
INS.
(Feb.
4,
2016),
http://businessinsurance.com/artice//20160204/NEWS08/160209901/did-textingscandal-derail-tennessee-workers-comp-opt-out-effort?tags=%7C92%7C329%7C304.
76. From the AWARC’s website:
The Association for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’
Compensation (ARAWC) is a national organization comprised of
employers, workers’ compensation system providers, and industry
experts dedicated to enacting state workers’ compensation
alternatives (an Option) that deliver better outcomes to employees,
while giving employers a choice in how they manage their injury
benefits programs.
ARAWC, About Us, http://arawc.org/about/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
77. Amy O’Connor, South Carolina Jumps Aboard Workers’ Comp Alternative
Bandwagon,
INS.
JOURNAL
(June
10,
2015),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/06/10/371088.htm.
78. Workers’ Compensation Opt-Out: Can Privatization Work?, NEW STREET
GROUP
(Nov.
2012),
https://www.sedgwik.com/docs/pressrelease/WCOptOutStudy.pdf. Opt-out proponents complain that the system has become too expensive
because employers lack control over provider selection, enforcement of “evidencebased” medicine is insufficient, pharmaceutical abuse and use of opioids has been
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essential issue then, is the legal limit of business subsidization by
the states. A business environment without rules—without
workers’ compensation or tort—is clearly a much cheaper place to
operate, and it is apparent that the opt-out movement has its
sights set on elimination of an employer’s obligation to pay
permanent incapacity benefits.79 The question is whether there
are any constitutional limitations on that subsidization and,
therefore, any principled limit on legislative privatization of
public rights. In the workers’ compensation context, White once
appeared to require that tort substitutions for workplace injury
be “reasonably just” to pass judicial muster.80 If none of White
remains viable, it may be a short road to judicial authorization of
any legislative reduction of personal injury remedies, as states
race to the bottom and the federal courts refuse to intervene. If
money is the predominant measure of rationality, the lowest cost
workers’ compensation or tort system will always be, at a
minimum, rational.81
III. A TALE OF THREE STATES: TEXAS, OKLAHOMA, AND
FLORIDA
A. TEXAS
Texas is unique among the states,82 with a workers’
inadequately curtailed, the complexity of terminating temporary disability is
excessive, permanent partial disability awards have been pervasive, and dispute
resolution procedures are expensive and cumbersome. Id. at 6.
79. With respect to the elimination of permanent incapacity benefits, see infra
note 176 and accompanying text. In 2013, the direct costs of workers’ compensation
injuries were roughly $60 billion. See 2016 Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index,
LIBERTY
MUT.
RESEARCH
INST.
FOR
SAFETY,
https://www.libertymutualgroup.com/about-liberty-mutual-site/research-institutesite/Documents/2016%20WSI.pdf (last visited May 26, 2016).
80. See White, supra, note 46 and accompanying text.
81. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 626 (“Whatever its advantages, a society
without a law for the redress of private wrongs may be a society more prone than ours
to accept a relatively thin, Holmesian notion of legal obligation, a less robust civil
society, and a more statist conception of how government interacts with its citizens.”).
82. See Meagan Flynn, Don’t Fall Down on the Job in Texas: Employers Don’t
Have to Provide Injury Coverage, HOUSTON PRESS (Feb. 2, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/don-t-fall-down-on-the-job-in-texas-employersdon-t-have-to-provide-injury-coverage-8120319. Texas is not the only current opt-out
state. Oklahoma, soon to be discussed, is the second such state. It may technically be
correct to say that Oklahoma is not a “true” opt-out state because it formally requires
employers to “comply” with its workers’ compensation statute authorizing opt-out. The
difference is semantical, however, as the article will describe, the statute provides
employers two methods to not comply with the “traditional” law: opt-out and
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compensation system that has allowed employers to opt out of the
system entirely since its conception in the early twentieth
century.83 More precisely, while several other states initially
enacted elective statutes (like the one in Texas), they all
subsequently switched to compulsory systems.84 Employers in
Texas, including large employers, routinely opt-out.85 What
makes Texas paradigmatic is not its “new” approach but its
perennial status as a deregulatory model.86 Critics of the Texas
system allege that:
Most Texans who are outside the workers’ comp system—
more than a million people—do get private occupational
insurance from their employers. But those plans aren’t regulated
by the state and can be crafted to sharply limit employees’
benefits, legal rights and health care choices. Only 41 percent of
the plans include death benefits, for example, according to state
surveys.87
Texas has been at or near the top of national workplace death
rates in recent years,88 and explanations abound as to why this is
so.89 Whatever the reasons, there have been dramatic industrial
mishaps involving opt-out employers. For example, one of the
underpublicized facts revealed during investigation of the
arbitration. See infra Part III. B.
83. In Texas, opt-out employers may either withdraw from the system entirely
and “go bare,” or establish an “alternative benefit plan,” providing a form of putatively
contractual benefits that need not conform in any manner to the statutory workers’
compensation system. See infra Part III. A.
84. Initially, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, many workers’
compensation statutes throughout the United States were elective. Thus, employers
in several states were permitted to “not opt in,” which was the functional equivalent
of opting out. States structuring their statutes in this way did so out of concern that
the U.S. Supreme Court would strike down compulsory workers’ compensation
systems on due process grounds. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56,
at 93, 104.
85. COSTCO provides a ready example of a large employer taking advantage of
the opportunity to provide a non-statutory injury reimbursement option. See New
Street Group, supra note 78, at 27.
86. Jason Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of Innovation?,
2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323, 339 (2011).
87. Jay Root, Hurting for Work, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 29, 2014),
http://apps.texastribune.org/hurting-for-work/.
88. See Bill Bowen, As Workplace Deaths Fall Nationally, They Remain
Stubbornly High in Texas, DALLAS MORNING News (Sept. 15, 2012),
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120915-as-workplace-deaths-fallnationally-they-remain-stubbornly-high-in-texas.ece.
89. See, e.g., James Gordon, Death on the Job: Texas Workers More Likely to Die
Than Counterparts Elsewhere, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 16, 2014),
http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/2014_workplace/.
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devastating fertilizer facility explosion that rocked West Texas in
April 2013—a blast that registered 2.1 on the Richter scale90—
was that the company running the plant was a “nonsubscriber,”
an opt-out employer.91 Although none of the plant’s workers were
injured or killed in the blast,92 the company would have suffered
no heightened workers’ compensation expense had those workers
become victims. Despite having the regular practice of storing the
explosive substance, ammonium nitrate, on its premises, the
plant was insured for only one million dollars.93 Damages
resulting from the accident were estimated at 100 million
dollars.94 Under-deterrence and under-insurance were, in other
words, a pervasive feature of the plant’s operations, and opt-out
was intertwined with this unsafe profile.95
One of the ameliorating features of the Texas opt-out system
is that employees of opt-out employers retain the right to sue their
employers in tort for workplace injuries.96 However, opt-out
employers providing their employees an alternative benefit
plan—a benefit not required under Texas law, which permits
employers to “go bare” and provide no wage loss or medical
benefits at all97—may effectively require their employees to waive
90. Ian Urbina et al., After Plant Explosion, Texas Remains Wary of Regulation,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/us/after-plantexplosion-texas-remains-wary-ofregulation.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all.
91. Arthur D. Postal, West Fertilizer Blast Spotlights Texas Workers Comp
System, Okla. Legislation, Property Casualty 360° (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/04/24/west-fertilizer-blast-spotlight-texasworkers-com.
92. The explosion killed fifteen non-employees and injured two hundred others.
Doug J. Swanson & Reese Dunklin, West Fertilizer Co. Was Insured For Only $1
Million, A Fraction of The Estimated Losses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 3, 2013,
11:03 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/west-explosion/headlines/20130503west-fertilizer-co.-was-insured-for-only-1-million-a-fraction-of-the-estimatedlosses.ece.
93. Id.
94. An amount a mere two hundred and fifty thousand dollars higher than the
seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars that is required for a company to insure a
single egg truck on the roadways. Id.
95. The West explosion obviously cannot be thought to reflect the erosion of a
historically non-mandatory Texas system. However, because in Texas a non-subscriber
is authorized to either develop an alternative plan regulated by ERISA, or to “go bare”
in hard economic times, the incentive for underinsurance seems high.
96. See Sheena Harrison, Texas Employers Still Opting Out Despite Lawsuits,
BUSINESS
INSURANCE
(Jan.
17,
2016,
12:01
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160117/NEWS08/301179995/texasemployers-still-opting-out-of-states-workers-compensation.
97. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2015).
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a tort suit and participate in arbitration as a condition of
employment.98 While pre-injury waivers of the right to sue are
forbidden under Texas law,99 the Texas courts have held that the
state may not prohibit the waivers then accompanied by a promise
to arbitrate as a result of preemption by the Federal Arbitration
Act.100 As one commentator has noted:
[I]f an employer can secure waivers from its employees
before injuries, it can effectively neutralize the threat
of negligence suits. It can thus secure the principal
benefit of a workers’ compensation system, namely
near immunity from employer’s liability lawsuits,
while at the same time providing stingy or no benefits
to the employees in return.101
In Texas, opting out of the workers’ compensation system
requires only that an employer notify the Texas Workers’
Compensation Division of the Department of Insurance of its optout status and that it inform employees at the time of hire of the
status.102 An employer must also conspicuously post notices of its
opt-out status in the workplace.103 In 2014, 33 percent of Texas
employers opted out of the workers’ compensation system.104 An
estimated 20 percent of Texas private-sector employees
(representing approximately 1.9 million employees in 2014)
worked for non-subscribing employers.105 In 2014, two-thirds of
non-subscribing employers, representing about 22 percent of
Texas employers overall, provided no alternative benefit plan.106
However, because Texas opt-out employers providing alternative
benefit plans tend to be large, they employ 75 percent of the optout employee population.107 Thus, in Texas, 25 percent of the 1.9
98. See Harrison, supra note 96.
99. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2015).
100. More precisely, the FAA would require a court to grant a motion to compel
arbitration and either dismiss or hold in abeyance a post-injury lawsuit. On the ever
encroaching phenomenon of arbitration, see Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and
Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J.
2940, 2942-43 (2015).
101. Ohana, supra note 86, at 355.
102. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015).
103. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.005 (West 2015).
104. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SETTING THE STANDARD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
THE 2005 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS ON THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM,
2014
RESULTS,
at
118
(Dec.
2014),
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/dwc/documents/2014regbiennialrpt.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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million opt-out employees—475,000 employees—are not covered
by alternative benefit plans nor by the workers’ compensation
statute.
Concerning the alternative benefit plans for those who are
covered by such mechanisms, employers have no obligation to
match or even approach the level of statutory workers’
compensation benefits that would otherwise be required by law.108
In the words of former Chief Justice Hardberger of the Texas
Fourth Court of Appeals:
A non-subscribing employer has unfettered discretion
in determining the amount of benefits it will provide
employees under an alternative plan. In exchange for
these benefits, regardless of how minimal, the worker
is prevented from presenting his claims to a jury by
being required either to waive his right to sue or to
submit his claims to binding arbitration. This is
unacceptable.109
Under the Texas system of workers’ compensation
arbitration, figures show that employers require their employees
to sign an arbitration agreement for personal injury before an
injury has occurred, and that three-quarters of employers
108. Phil Hardberger, C.J., Texas Workers’ Compensation: A Ten Year Survey –
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
109. Id. See also Ohana, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation, supra note 86, at
341-42.
Of the 52 percent of non-subscribing employers that paid
occupational injury benefits in 2008, only 70 percent covered
medical costs. Of those that covered medical costs, 63 percent
covered expenses for as long as they were medically necessary, while
the remaining 37 percent capped medical expenses either with a
dollar limit, a time limit, or both. Applying these percentages to the
larger universe of non-subscribers, the total percentage of nonsubscribers that provided a medical expense benefit to injured
employees in 2008 was approximately 36 percent, with
approximately 23 percent of non-subscribers providing benefits for
as long as medically necessary and 13 percent providing benefits up
to a time or dollar limit. The numbers are similar for wage
replacement benefits. Approximately 35 percent of all nonsubscribers paid occupational injury benefits and 68 percent of
those non-subscribers paid wage replacement benefits in 2008. Of
these, 57 percent paid wage replacement benefits for the entire
duration of the employee’s lost time; the remaining 43 percent paid
wage replacement benefits subject to a durational or dollar limit.
Again, applying these percentages to the larger universe of nonsubscribers, only about 20 percent of non-subscribers provided wage
replacement benefits for the entire duration of their employees’ lost
time.
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requiring arbitration knew the arbitrator who presided at
arbitration hearings, and that in half of those instances the
arbitrator was employed by the employer.110
Based on these patchwork features, it could be reasonably
questioned whether workers’ compensation actually exists in
Texas as a rights-based system. However, because Texas never
accepted a compulsory workers’ compensation system,111 it is
difficult to contend that a societal grand bargain was breached.
Both employers and employees have been able to opt out of (or not
opt in to) Texas workers’ compensation from its inception.112 To
the extent that employees are denied the opportunity of a
reasonable remedy for workplace injury, the question of whether
the Texas system is constitutionally adequate remains open. On
the one hand, negligence suits remain available to employees of
opt-out employers. However, this raises the specter of the
cumbersome and expensive tort system, replete with the same
affirmative defenses that spurred the creation of workers’
compensation. At the same time, operation of compulsory
arbitration makes it extremely uncertain that an injured worker
will make it to trial.
B. OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma is the most recent state to adopt a workers’
compensation system that authorizes opt-out.113 Unlike Texas,
Oklahoma requires employers either to formally participate in the
state’s traditional workers’ compensation system—by obtaining
insurance or becoming self-insured—or to submit for state
approval an alternative benefit plan.114 Thus, employers in

110. Ohana, supra note 86, at 343-44. As of 2014, it appeared that seventy-nine
percent of non-subscribers using arbitration (14 percent in 2014) required their
employees to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of hire. Approximately
sixty-six percent of large non-subscriber employers use arbitration. See EMPLOYER
PARTICIPATION IN THE TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 2014 ESTIMATES, at
38, TEXAS DEP’T OF INSURANCE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION
GROUP
(2014),
available
at
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/wcreg/documents/nonsub.pdf. Curiously, tracking of
employers with ongoing relationships with arbitrators has not been undertaken in the
2014 Texas Report the 2008 version of which formed the corpus of Ohana’s findings,
see Ohana, supra note 86, at 344.
111. Ohana, supra note 86, at 339.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Pilkington v. Doak, No. PR-113662, 3 (Okla. 2015) (review denied).
114. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, §§ 3, 202 (West 2015).
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Oklahoma may not “go bare.”115
Oklahoma employees, compelled to participate in alternative
benefit pans, continue to be bound by the exclusive remedy rule.116
Therefore, unlike the situation in Texas, Oklahoma employees
participating in an alternative benefit plan (who are therefore not
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits) are also not entitled
to bring tort suits.117 This presents a rather stark quid pro quo
problem because the original rationale for relinquishment of tort
rights was the reciprocal conferral on employees of generous
workers’ compensation benefits. Oklahoma employees of opt-out
employers have lost a functional legal right to a remedy for
workplace injury.118 Generally, just as in Texas, workers’
compensation benefits may not lawfully be waived under the
Oklahoma Act.119 However, and also as is the case in Texas,120
employers may enter into agreements with employees waiving
workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of arbitration.121 And,
such agreements are probably enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act.122
Some background is required to grasp these developments.
In 2013, the Oklahoma legislature abrogated the former Workers’
Compensation Code123 and replaced it with three interrelated
statutes: the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act,124 the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act,125 and the Workers’

115. They may, however, enter into agreements with employees to arbitrate
workers’ compensation claims under a discrete section of the Workers’ Compensation
Act called, “The Workers’ Compensation Arbitration Act.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6085A, § 300 (West 2015).
116. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 209(A) (West 2015).
117. Id.
118. The counter to this contention is that employers may be bound to comply with
the terms of the alternative plans they do provide if the plans are covered by ERISA.
As a practical matter, this amounts to a requirement that an employer comply with a
plan the terms of which it unilaterally determines, which is not an obligation
comporting with usual conceptions of a “right.”
119. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 8 (West 2015).
120. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 301 (West 2015).
121. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 304 (West 2015).
122. The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question. See, e.g.,
Morales v. Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 319 (2010) (cert. denied). See Brief for
Guadalupe Morales as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, In re Morales, 2010
WL 2912538 (2010) (No. 10-134) (arguing among other things that the 10th
Amendment prevents Congress from legislating in traditional state areas).
123. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A (2015).
124. Id. at § 1.
125. Id. at § 200.
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Compensation Arbitration Act.126 The second of these statutes,
the Employee Injury Benefit Act, would allow “certain employers
to adopt and administer benefit plans consistent with the
Administrative Act, and the Workers’ Arbitration Compensation
Act.”127 However, appeals of benefit determinations under the
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act are made to a private
employer’s internal adjudication committee rather than to a state
or other public official.128 Following internal review of the
committee decision, an aggrieved employee may appeal to the
state Workers’ Compensation Commission.
This statutory requirement assumes that any occupational
injury plan not covered by the workers’ compensation statute—
that is, an alternative benefit plan—is covered by ERISA.
However, this remains an open question.129 The Employee Injury
126. Id. at § 300.
127. Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924, 924 (Okla. 2013).
128. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 211(B)(1-4) (2015). At least one justice of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court would find this provision unconstitutional on its face.
Coates, 316 P.3d at 929 (Reif, J., dissenting in part).
129. ERISA provides:
The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” mean
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). The Act in relevant part exempts from ERISA any
employee benefit plan “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workmen’s compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance
laws.” Id. § 1003(b)(3).
ERISA states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
Id. § 1144(a). However, ERISA exempts in relevant parts any employee benefit plan
“maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s
compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws.” Id.
§ 1003(b)(3). The underlying logical assumption is that creating an alternative benefit
plan is precisely for the purpose of not complying with a “workmen’s compensation
law.” Yet opt-out plans are only permissible if compliance with the Oklahoma
Employee Injury Benefit Act is achieved, and it is arguable whether that statute is a
“workmen’s compensation law.”
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Benefit Act also requires that the Commission “rely on the record
established by the internal appeal process and use an objective
standard of review that is not arbitrary or capricious.”130 The
ability of an employer to opt out is liberally authorized. The
employer is required only to provide notice to state officials and
employees,131 develop a written benefit plan,132 post a bond of
$1,500,133 and provide additional assurances to insurance officials
that it has sufficient assets “in an amount determined by the
Commissioner which shall be at least an average of the yearly
claims for the last three (3) years.”134 In short, it is meant to be—
and is—very easy for an employer to opt out of workers’
compensation by adopting an alternative benefit plan in
Oklahoma.135
Procedural innovations, such as those discussed above, do
not, of course, immediately implicate the quid pro quo, which is
usually regarded as a question of the adequacy of the substantive
exchange of rights and remedies.136 The procedural due process
implications
in
the
design
of
employer-dominated
“committees,”137 coupled with limited judicial review are plain
enough, but are beyond the scope of this discussion.138 One is
130. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 211, B., 6 (2015). Notably, this standard of review
affords courts less discretion in reviewing plan decisions than they would have in
reviewing an agency decision under the Oklahoma Administrative Workers’
Compensation Act, which provides traditional APA review. See id. § 78(A).
131. The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act provides that the employer’s
notice must be provided to employees at the time of hire, and such employers shall
notify employees “that it does not carry workers’ compensation insurance coverage and
that such coverage has terminated or been cancelled.” Id. at § 202(H), (I).
132. Id. § 202(A)(2).
133. Id. § 202(B).
134. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 204(B)(2)(a)(1) (2015).
135. However, as has been mentioned, it is even easier for an employer to opt-out
of the system in Texas as of this writing. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West
2013).
136. Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Pa. 1990) (“Where statutory
remedies are provided, the procedure prescribed by the statute must be strictly
pursued, to the exclusion of other methods of redress.”) (internal quotations omitted)
(citation omitted).
137. Both Oklahoma and federal courts have insisted that a fundamental element
of due process is a fair and impartial trial. Clark v. Bd. of Educ. Of Indiana School
Dist. No. 89, 32 P.3d 851, 854 (Okla. 2001). This includes a neutral and detached
decision maker. Id. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally
unacceptable, but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.’”) (citation omitted).
138. In a recent successful administrative challenge to the Injury Benefit Act,
procedural due process arguments did not factor into the Workers’ Compensation
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inclined to agree with Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Combs
in Coates v. Fallin,139 the first state Supreme Court case
challenging the constitutionality of the Employee Injury Benefit
Act.140 A number of “disparate treatment” issues under this
unilateral employer system will emerge but must await future
judicial analysis.141 Nevertheless, facial quid pro quo challenges,
alleging both inadequate procedure and substance, appear
unavoidable and have already begun.142
Furthermore, as
elsewhere in the law, what might initially seem procedural can
have a profoundly substantive impact on a case. As Thomas Main
recently wrote, procedure is a tool of power and can negate
substantive rights.143
Nevertheless, with respect to substance, the alternative
benefit plan an employer is permitted to provide (even as it
maintains the exclusive remedy rule)144 is as follows:
The benefit plan shall provide for payment of the same
forms of benefits included in the Administrative
Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent
partial
disability,
vocational
rehabilitation,
permanent total disability, disfigurement, amputation
Commission’s conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional. Vasquez v. Dillard’s,
Inc., CM-2014-11060L (Okla. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n) (Feb. 26, 2016); see also
Michael C. Duff, Workers’ Comp Agency Declares Oklahoma Opt-Out Statute
Unconstitutional, LEXISNEXIS NEWSROOM: WORKERS COMP. LAW (Feb. 28, 2016, 11:31
PM).
139. 316 P.3d 924 (Okla. 2013).
140. See id. at 924-25 (deciding constitutional issues as matters of first
impression).
141. “As the law has not yet taken effect, it is unclear exactly how these issues will
manifest themselves in future cases or controversies, but it is necessary to
acknowledge the constitutional problems these Acts will produce when claimants
begin to receive disparate treatment in their recourse to the law based upon
decisions made by their employers.” Id. at 925 (Combs, J., concurring).
142. A leading Oklahoma practitioner informs the author that multiple cases in
Oklahoma are pending that charge legislative violations of the “grand bargain”/quid
pro quo. See McAnany, Van Cleave & Philips, P.A., Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation
17,
19,
20,
21
(2015),
http://www.mvplaw.com/post/articles/Oklahoma%20Materials(1).pdf (listing Duck v.
Morgan Tie, No. 113,601 (Okla.), Torres v. Seaboard Foods, No. 113-649 (Okla.),
Deason v. Integris Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 113,648 (Okla.), Mullendore v. Mercy Hosp.
Ardmore, No. 113,560 (Okla.), Robinson v. Fairview Fellowship Home, No. 113,735
(Okla.), Brown v. Claims Mgmt. Res., No. 113,609 (Okla.), and Nowlin v. Medicalodges,
Inc., No. 113,607 (Okla.) as pending appeals before the Oklahoma Supreme Court).
143. Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV., 801, 818 (2010).
144. See DUFF, supra note 23, at 326.
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or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled member,
death and medical benefits as a result of an
occupational injury, on a no-fault basis, with the same
statute of limitations, and with dollar, percentage, and
duration limits that are at least equal to or greater
than the dollar, percentage, and duration limits
contained in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this title. For
this purpose, the standards for determination of
average weekly wage, death beneficiaries, and
disability under the Administrative Workers’
Compensation Act shall apply under the Oklahoma
Employee Injury Benefit Act; but no other provision of
the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act
defining covered injuries, medical management,
dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or
penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under
the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act, unless
expressly incorporated.145
A reading of this language might initially show that the
substantive core of the traditional Act has been preserved.146
However, this preliminary conclusion will not withstand scrutiny
and ignores the depth, range, and subtlety of substantive disputes
that arise in workers’ compensation cases. For example, the
provision provides for the same “forms” of benefits for various
categories of disability.147 Perhaps this means that both medical
and indemnity benefits are the only benefits available under the
Act. Or, perhaps it means something more. In any event, the
language does not specify amounts of damage for degrees of
incapacity, as would be the case in a workers’ compensation
statute. In a similar vein, there may be no question that, if an
employee is totally incapacitated for work, that employee would
be entitled to a benefit amount based on the average weekly wage
at the time of injury, as traditionally calculated, and for the
duration of the incapacity;148 yet, the pivotal issue in workers’
compensation claims is often causation.149 Causation lurks
behind seemingly banal phrases such as “covered injuries,”
145. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015).
146. The statute appears to incorporate most of the disability benefits structure of
the Act. That is, the provision seems to require alternative benefits to pay permanent
and temporary benefits that are both total and partial. Id. § 45(A)-(D).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 45(C)-(D).
149. 82 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TO WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE § 194 (2d ed. 2013) (hereinafter “AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE”).
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“medical management,” and “dispute resolution,” all of which are
explicitly unmoored from the traditional Act.150 Thus, a causation
dispute will often involve sharply contested medical evidence151
that will now be weighed, credited, or rejected by employerdesignated fact finders subject to ultra-deferential judicial
review.152
In addition, alternative plans are not required to adhere to
the traditional Act’s provisions on “medical management.”153 This
exemption apparently refers to the traditional Act’s requirement
that an injured worker be afforded a right to choose his or her own
doctor.154 As observers of injury law are aware, parties to many
contested cases provide fact finders with medical opinions that
are diametrically opposed on, for example, the cause and duration
of a claimant’s disability.155 Presumably under an alternative
benefit plan, an employer would have discretion as to whether to
pay for the services or to accept into evidence the medical opinion
of a claimant’s treating doctor. Thus, an employer is in a position
to send an injured worker to his preferred physician and the issue
of dueling doctors or independent medical examiners becomes
extinguished.156
Paragraph C. of the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act
states:
The benefit plan may provide for lump-sum payouts
that are, as reasonably determined by the
administrator of such plan appointed by the qualified
employer, actuarially equivalent to expected future
payments. The benefit plan may also provide for
settlement agreements; provided, however, any
settlement agreement by a covered employee shall be
voluntary, entered into not earlier than the tenth
business day after the date of the initial report of
injury, and signed after the covered employee has
received a medical evaluation from a nonemergency
care doctor, with any waiver of rights being
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 203(B) (2015).
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 149, at § 543.
Coates v. Fallin, 316 P.3d 924, 926 (Okla. 2013) (Combs, J., dissenting).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015).
“Medical management” is a vague term. One assumes it means overall
management of a patient by a doctor. See, e.g., Tortorelli v. Mercy Health Center, 242
P.3d 549, 556 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 2010).
155. See DUFF, supra note 23, at 255-56.
156. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015). Spieler & Burton, supra note 67,
at 501-02.
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conspicuous and on the face of the agreement. The
benefit plan shall pay benefits without regard to
whether the covered employee, the qualified employer,
or a third party caused the occupational injury; and
provided further, that the benefit plan shall provide
eligibility to participate in and provide the same forms
and levels of benefits to all Oklahoma employees of the
qualified employer. The Administrative Workers’
Compensation Act shall not define, restrict, expand or
otherwise apply to a benefit plan.157
In other words, an administrator appointed solely by the
employer determines whether the employee’s lump sum payments
are “actuarially equivalent” to future benefits. The provision
affords no limitations on the selection or qualifications of the
administrator. Such a determination would typically involve a
cautious exercise of judgment in making accurate assessments of
the expected lifetime value of a claim, and again in calculating the
present value of that claim.158 These determinations can be
complex and subject to dispute.159 Additionally, the text of the
provision gives no indication that, subsequent to execution of the
agreement, the settlement must be approved by a public official,
or that an aggrieved injured worker could obtain judicial review
of the agreement. Furthermore, a plan may authorize settlement
agreements and waivers as early as ten business days after an
injury,160 when the magnitude of an injury may still not be fully
known. This presents problems similar to pre-injury waivers of
injury. While waivers must be conspicuous, nothing in the
provision requires that waivers be knowing or intelligent.161 An
employee might easily sign away all rights before becoming aware
of the magnitude of an injury and, therefore, will have limited
access to judicial review thereafter.162
To say that a system like Oklahoma’s might provoke legal
challenge is an understatement. To say that the Oklahoma
system might get “bad press” is obvious. However, it remains true
that the Oklahoma legislature enacted the system, and courts do

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(C) (2015).
DUFF, supra note 23, at 190.
Id.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A § 203(C) (2015).
Valles v. Daniel Constr. Co., 589 S.W.2d 911 913 (Tenn. 1979).
Of course, it is somewhat unclear what rights could be waived since so much
of the traditional Act may be excluded from an injury benefit plan. See OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(C) (2015).
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not lightly set aside the acts of legislatures.163 Further, the
system is not irrational if the measure of rationality is saving
businesses money. However, if the rights being displaced by the
Employee Injury Benefit Act are fundamental, or even “very
important,” such that the level of scrutiny applied by courts is
higher than that applied when reviewing merely economic
regulation,164 the Oklahoma system may continue to be quite
vulnerable to legal attack because of the high risk that, through
its operation, injured workers will be deprived of reasonable
remedies.165
C. FLORIDA
In some states, critics have alleged that the incremental
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits has resulted in
abandonment of the workers’ compensation quid pro quo or grant
bargain.166 In those states, legislatures have significantly scaled
back the amount or duration of indemnity benefits and limited
medical treatment of work-related injuries.167 In these erosional
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1897).
See infra Part IV. B.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
Grabell & Berkes, Demolition, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
As a bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 2009, but not passed,

recited:
Since [1972], changes in reductions in State workers’ compensation
laws have increased the inadequacy and inequitable levels of
workers’ compensation benefits. Serious questions exist concerning
the fairness and adequacy of present workers’ compensation laws in
light of the growth of the economy, changing nature of the labor
force, misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and
as leased employees, as well as erosion of remedies for the bad faith
handling and delay in payment of benefits and medical care to
workers and their families, increases in medical knowledge,
changes in the hazards associated with various employment, new
risks to health and safety created by new technology, and increases
in the general level of wages and in the cost of living.
National Commission on State Workers’ Compensation Laws Act of 2009, H.R. 635,
11th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).
Recently, stories in the popular press have been arguing the same point:
Since 2003, legislators in 33 states have passed workers’ comp laws
that reduce benefits or make it more difficult for those with certain
injuries and diseases to qualify for them. Florida has cut benefits to
its most severely disabled workers by 65 percent since 1994. . . .
Many states have not only shrunk the payments to injured workers;
they’ve also cut them off after an arbitrary time limit—even if
workers haven’t recovered.
Howard Berkes, Injured Workers Suffer as ‘Reforms’ Limit Workers’ Compensation
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contexts it has been argued that the societal deal originally struck
in the quid pro quo of workers’ compensation has been
breached.168 Conceptually, the theory is challenged by attempting
to establish the point at which reductions in benefits have
effectively eliminated the workers’ compensation bargain.
Unlike opt-out, systems that are gradually reducing benefits
do not face the critique that they have suddenly eliminated
workers’ compensation rights without any legal guarantee of a
“reasonably justified substitute.”169 Of course, those complaining
of incremental erosion may suspect legislative motives of eventual
elimination of all remedies, but it is usually a conceptual leap to
convince appellate courts to expand challenges to that extent.
One significant historical complication of the erosional argument
is that very early versions of workers’ compensation statutes
provided benefits that were at times substantially less generous
than those contained in modern workers’ compensation
statutes.170 As a practical matter, from the very start of workers’
compensation, benefits varied widely by state and according to
historical economic circumstances.171
This is conceptually
problematic for challengers because it makes it difficult to
establish a uniform baseline against which to measure “the grand
bargain.”
A case recently litigated in Florida provides an excellent
example of an incremental reductionist claim. In Padgett v. State
of Florida,172 a plaintiff challenged the unfolding of the 2003
Benefits, NPR (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/04390441655/injuredworkers-suffer-as-reforms-limit-workers-compensation-benefits (last visited June 25,
2016).
168. Amanda Yoder, Resurrection of a Dead Remedy: Bringing Common Law
Negligence Back into Employment Law, 75 MO. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2010) (“The
original bargain struck between employer and employee that formed the basis of
worker compensation statutes [in Missouri] is no longer the same balanced
exchange.”).
169. Especially with respect to an opt-out structure that both retains the exclusive
remedy rule and eliminates employees’ rights to a statutory workers’ compensation
benefit. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001) (finding that
remedy clause in state constitution mandated that a remedy be available to all persons
for injuries to “absolute” common-law rights for which a cause of action existed when
the drafters wrote the constitution, and concluding that, having demonstrated that
there was no remedial process available under present workers’ compensation laws,
plaintiff should have been allowed to proceed with negligence action).
170. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 174-75 (providing
statistical information showing the wide variation in workers’ compensation benefit
levels from 1911-1930).
171. Id.
172. Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
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revisions to Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.173 Plaintiff
challenged the requirement that injured workers in some
instances be responsible for payment of medical treatment
necessitated by their work-related injuries,174 an obligation that
is at odds with core understandings of the nature of workers’
compensation.175 Another major challenge raised was to the 2003
elimination of wage loss benefits for partial incapacity.176
Padgett commenced when an injured worker sued his
employer for negligence.177 The employer raised the defense of
exclusive remedy immunity of the Florida Workers’
Compensation Act.178 In response, the plaintiff amended his
complaint, seeking a declaration that the exclusive remedy
immunity was both invalid and violated due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the open courts,

13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds). Padgett had a complicated procedural
history and reviewed Cortes v. Velda Farms, No. 11-13661 CA 25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
13, 2014), one of a series of consolidated cases. Cortes was dismissed on mootness and
standing grounds, so the merits were not ultimately discussed by the Florida appellate
courts. State v. Florida Workers’ Advocates, 167 So.3d 500, 504 (Fla. App. 3 Dist.
2015). Cortes is nevertheless the focus of the ensuing discussion because it so squarely
raised the essential incremental-erosional challenge. Other similar cases are in the
pipelines as of this writing. See, e.g., Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 124 So.3d 392, 394
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2013), and Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So.3d 440 (Fla.
App. 1 Dist. 2013), review granted by Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 143 So.3d 924
(Fla. 2013). Throughout the discussion, and for procedural reasons I deliberately omit,
I will refer to the Cortes trial order as “Padgett.”
173. Id.
174. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1-2.
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id.
In most states, the most expensive category of cases are for
permanent partial disability. A nine-state study that examined the
costs of cases as of March 2002 for injuries that occurred in 1998999 found that over one-half of cases in which temporary disability
lasted more than 7 days resulted in permanent partial disability in
six of the nine states (Telles, Wang, and Tanabe 2004). The median
cost of such cases in the nine states exceeded $32,000. Blum and
Burton (2003, Table 7A) have reported that the average amount of
cash benefits paid per permanent partial disability case nationally
for accident (injury) year 1999 was over $35,000. Many permanent
partial disability cases take years to resolve; in some states, a
significant fraction were not closed more than 3 years after the
injury date.
Peter S. Barth, Compensating Workers for Permanent Partial Disabilities, 65 SOC. SEC.
BULLETIN 16, 18 (2004), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4pl6.html.
177. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1.
178. Id.

DUFF (DO NOT DELETE)

152

10/22/2016 9:39 AM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17.2

and under provisions of the Florida Constitution.179 The employer
withdrew its exclusive remedy defense, and the court severed it
as a party from the declaratory relief portion of the complaint.180
The employer’s exit from the case called into question the
existence of a reviewable controversy on standing grounds,181 an
issue that would essentially result in the case’s dismissal.182
Reviewability appeared preliminarily to be restored when
Padgett, a “concrete” workers’ compensation beneficiary allegedly
harmed by the statute, was allowed to intervene.183
Understanding the Padgett context requires some work. In
1968, Florida revised its Constitution and Declaration of
Rights.184 At the time of the revision, the Florida Workers’
Compensation Act provided full payment for medical treatment
and weekly indemnity benefits for partially disabled workers.185
In 1970, the legislature amended the Act to, among other things,
prevent injured workers from opting out of workers’ compensation
and suing in tort,186 which, up until that time, had been
authorized.187 No increased benefits were afforded to workers in
exchange for relinquishing their right to sue.188 In 1973, Florida
became a comparative (as opposed to a contributory) negligence
state.189 As a result, plaintiffs could not be absolutely barred from

179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
181. For a discussion of the procedural handling of the case, see Thomas Robinson,
Florida Appellate Court Throws Out Judge Cueto’s “Padgett” Decision on Procedural
Grounds, THE WORKCOMP WRITER, available at http://www.workcompwriter.com/howone-state-bucked-trend-of-allowing-former-spouse-to-access-post-divorce-workerscomp-benefits/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
182. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 1.
183. Id. Padgett, in other words, could demonstrate having suffered a concrete and
particularized harm. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
(reaffirming that for purposes of standing, “plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in
fact’—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is . . . concrete and
particularized.”).
184. See CONST. OF THE STATE OF FLA. (revised and amended 1968), FLA. SENATE,
http://flsenate.gov/Laws/Constitution.
185. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 3.
186. Id. at 7.
187. The employee opt-out right was apparently originally conferred to mirror the
employer’s corresponding right to opt out of the system, a right that was also
extinguished as part of the 1970 amendments. Id. at 3-4. One may recall that Texas
affords both employers and employees the right to opt out of its Act. So, in an
interesting twist, Florida’s alleged abrogation of the exclusive remedy rule began with
cessation of opt-out.
188. Id. at 8.
189. Id. at 7.
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receiving a tort remedy if they “in any appreciable way
contributed to the proximate cause of the injury.”190 Accordingly,
stripping workers of the right to sue became a different
proposition under tort law, because tort plaintiffs had become
eligible to recover damages on a comparative negligence theory,
making recovery more likely than it had been in 1970.191 In 2000,
the Florida legislature suspended injured workers’ entitlement to
partial incapacity indemnity benefits.192 The Act, as amended in
2003,193 required—for the first time—that injured workers pay a
portion of medical treatment costs related to their work-related
injuries once these workers reached “maximum medical
improvement.”194
Given these developments, the trial court in Padgett
concluded that the quid pro quo of tort for workers’ compensation
was no longer adequate.195 The court opined that partial
incapacity attributable to an employer’s negligence in causing a
work-related injury would have been fully compensable in
negligence prior to the creation of the workers’ compensation
remedy, as would medical treatment made necessary by such
tortious conduct.196 Further, the exclusive remedy rule reduced
190. German-American Lumber Co. v. Hannah, 53 So. 516, 517 (Fla. 1910).
191. Contributory negligence automatically shuts off the plaintiff who is also
negligent in connection with a harm, while comparative negligence allows for the
possibility of tort recovery even where the plaintiff is also negligent. See Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 87, 882-83 (W.Va. 1979).
192. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 8. Under many workers’ compensation
statutes an injured worker would be entitled to both a scheduled benefit as a statutory
remuneration for the injury to a listed body part or member, and a partial benefit
based in some manner on a loss of earning capacity as reflected by the difference
between the worker’s pre-injury wage and post-injury earning capacity. See OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (2015) (discussing partial benefit designs). Professor John
Burton, the leading American academic commentator on workers’ compensation law,
testified by deposition in Padgett. According to Professor Burton, as of the date of his
testimony there was no other state in the country that had completely eliminated
workers’ compensation wage loss benefits for employees who had suffered a partial (as
opposed to a total) loss of work-related earning capacity. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25
at 4.
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.13(14)(c) (West 2012).
194. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, following overall
maximum medical improvements from an injury compensable under this chapter, the
employee is obligated to pay a copayment of $10 per visit for medical services. The
copayment shall not apply to emergency care provided to the employee.” Id. For a
definition of “Maximum Medical Improvement,” see infra note 214, § 560.
195. Padgett, No. 11-13661 CA 25 at 19-20.
196. Id. at 3, 8. Of course, this assumes that the work-related injury was not an
accident. What workers undeniably get from workers’ compensation is compensation
for accidents—a remedy that would not be available in a fault-based regime like
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aggregate liability for employers,197 but because of the reduction
in workers’ compensation benefits there was no longer a truly
correlative benefit for workers.198 Thus, the nature of the quid
pro quo changed.199 The court appeared to have accepted the
argument that workers were forced to give up more to participate
in the workers’ compensation system than had been the case prior
to 1970 as a result of losing the right to sue.200
The unified narrative from Padgett provides that, at the time
of the creation of the Florida exclusive remedy rule in 1935,201
workers were arguably satisfied with the quid pro quo because of
the toll that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence
took on common law negligence suits.202 However, Florida’s
replacement of contributory negligence with comparative
negligence203 meant that, if negligence could be established,
workers were much more likely to enjoy some recovery in tort. To
the extent recovery would exceed the typical workers’
compensation remedy of two-thirds of the average weekly wage at
the time of the injury,204 workers would prefer the negligence
recovery. Furthermore, a worker partially incapacitated or
disabled and suffering only a partial wage loss as a result of her
employer’s negligence might be entitled to complete recovery of
that wage loss in tort,205 but not in workers’ compensation.206
Similarly, an injured worker might be able to achieve in tort
complete recovery for medical expenses related to a work
injury,207 while under the present workers’ compensation system
in Florida there is a chance for less-than-full recovery for medical
treatment required by a work-related injury.208 The legal baseline
inherent in the quid pro quo has changed. The rhetorical question
posed is whether a hypothetical worker in the “original position”
during the inception of workers’ compensation would agree to this
negligence.
197. Id. at 4.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 16, 18.
200. See id. at 18 (explaining that after losing option of tort litigation, employees
no longer have right to sue for injuries).
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 436-37 (Fla. 1973).
204. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1)(a), (2)(a), (4)(a) (West 2012).
205. Padgett, at 16.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Id. at 4, 8.
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version of the grand bargain.209 The argument might continue
that the absence of worker premiums for changes in tort law
amounted to a windfall for employers.210
Under these
circumstances, maintaining the exclusive remedy rule is no longer
supportable.211
Florida courts faced similar arguments in recent years, but
in slightly different contexts. For example, in Westphal v. City of
St. Petersburg,212 a Florida appellate court was faced with an
interpretation of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act that
effectively left certain classification of totally incapacitated
workers without any remedy for workplace injury.213 In Westphal,
workers with temporary total disability for the maximum
statutory period for entitlement to benefits had not yet been found
to have reached maximum medical improvement214—a condition
precedent for transitioning from temporary to permanent
benefits.215 Thus, their entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits simply expired, even though they continued to be totally
disabled as a factual matter.216 Accordingly, an uncompensated
“gap” was created between the time of the temporary total
disability expiration and the point at which they were eventually
able to reestablish entitlement to total permanent benefits.217
While the court did not explicitly discuss quid pro quo, it did
observe that:
[A]n interpretation that would create a potential gap
in disability benefits could result in an uncorrectable
error. If the claim is denied because the disabled
worker may still improve and it turns out later that he
or she does not improve, the logical inference would be
that the worker had, in fact, reached maximum
medical improvement earlier. Yet there is nothing in
the law that would enable the worker to recover the
disability benefits he or she should have been
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 19-20.
122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 444.
Maximum medical improvement “is the point at which the employee’s injury
will not materially improve with additional rest or treatment.” 100 C.J.S. Workers’
Compensation § 650 (2013).
215. Id.
216. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
217. Id. at 446.
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receiving in the meantime. It is reasonable to
conclude that, if the Legislature had intended to create
a gap in the payment of disability benefits, it would
have at least provided a remedy for the recovery of lost
benefits if it could be shown later that the claimant
was actually at maximum medical improvement all
along and should have been receiving those
benefits. . . . [W]e have never before been confronted
with a constitutional challenge to the statutes in
question. Such a question was not presented . . . in
any other previous case presented to the court. It is
safe to say that the prospect of declaring the statute
unconstitutional put the issue in an entirely new
light.218
The strong implication was that workers left with no recovery
might have a basis for a constitutional challenge premised on the
lack of any remedy for injury.219 In Padgett, the trial court relied
heavily on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v.
Scanlan.220 There, the court rejected a quid pro quo argument
raised by Scanlan, who had challenged the 1990 workers’
compensation statutory amendments on a variety of theories.221
With respect to a challenge premised on breach of quid pro quo,
the court said:
Although chapter 90-201 undoubtedly reduces
benefits to eligible workers, the workers’
compensation law remains a reasonable alternative to
tort litigation. It continues to provide injured workers
with full medical care and wage-loss payments for
total or partial disability regardless of fault and
without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.
Furthermore, while there are situations where an

218. Id. at 447-48.
219. Westphal was recently reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court, which held
that:
[Section 440.15(2)(a)] of the workers’ compensation statute is
unconstitutional under article I, section 21, of the Florida
Constitution, as a denial of the right of access to courts, because it
deprives an injured worker of disability benefits under these
circumstances for an indefinite amount of time—thereby creating a
system of redress that no longer functions as a reasonable
alternative to tort litigation.
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, No. SC13-1930 (Fla. June 9, 2016).
220. 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991).
221. Martinez v. Scanlon, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1170-73 (Fla. 1991).
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employee would be eligible for benefits under the pre1990 workers’ compensation law and now, as a result
of chapter 90-201, is no longer eligible, that employee
is not without a remedy. There still may remain the
viable alternative of tort litigation in these instances.
As to this attack, the statute passes constitutional
muster.222
With respect to the language in Martinez (contentions that
the trial judge accepted), the plaintiff and Padgett argued that
recent developments had undercut Martinez’s rationale as to
workers’ compensation as a reasonable alternative to tort
litigation.223 After 2003, workers’ compensation in Florida no
longer provided injured workers with full medical care in some
cases, or with any wage loss compensation for partial disability.224
The plaintiff next argued that, in light of the benefit reductions,
injured workers are now authorized to proceed in tort.225 The
important conceptual point made in Padgett, a point that was
established implicitly by Martinez, is that the level and duration
of benefits could be subject to scrutiny for adequacy to ensure the
statute continued to pass constitutional muster under the Florida
Constitution.226 Martinez essentially opened the door for Padgett
and for future cases premised on continued benefit adequacy.
The Florida incremental erosion cases are driven by the
unique history and structure of the Florida Constitution. A
number of states possess constitutions containing language
requiring “open courts,”227 and Florida is no exception. Article I,
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution states that “[t]he courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”228 This
language may suggest that there must be at least some
substantive remedy for injury, and cases such as Westphal,
raising scenarios in which workers might be left with no
remedy,229 become problematic under such an interpretation.
However, not every state with an open courts provision has read

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 1171-72.
Padgett at 16.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Padgett at 16.
See infra Part IV.
FLA. STAT. ANN., CONST., art. 1, § 21 (West 1970).
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d at 448.
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a substantive right to a remedy into the provision.230
A second potent, anti-erosional feature of Florida law was
showcased in Kluger v. White.231 There, the Florida Supreme
Court considered a law providing that tort actions in connection
with automobile accidents were completely abolished where a
putative plaintiff carried automobile insurance or where a
plaintiff without insurance suffered damages of less than $550.232
In Kluger, because the fair market value of the plaintiff’s damaged
automobile was $250, she could receive no more than that amount
under Florida law.233 Because she also carried no insurance, the
plaintiff was effectively without a remedy for damages.234 The
court held that this abolishment of the remedy violated the
Florida open courts provision.235 In support of its conclusion, the
court first noted that it “ha[d] never before specifically spoken to
the issue of whether or not the constitutional guarantee of a
‘redress of any injury’ . . . bars the statutory abolition of an
existing remedy without providing an alternative protection to
the injured party.”236 Noting that Florida’s Declaration of Human
Rights had previously been found binding on the legislature,237
the court recited the following language from the Corpus Juris
Secundum:
A constitutional provision insuring a certain remedy
for all injuries or wrongs does not command
continuation of a specific statutory remedy. However,
in a jurisdiction wherein the constitutional guaranty
applies to the legislature as well as to the judiciary . . .
it has been held that the guaranty precludes the repeal
of a statute allowing a remedy where the statute was
in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Furthermore . . . the guaranty also prevents, in some
jurisdictions, the total abolition of a common-law
remedy.238
Because the right to a tort recovery for the type of automobile
accident suffered by the plaintiff existed prior to the adoption of

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See infra Part IV. A.
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
For text of the provision, see FLA. STAT. ANN., CONST., art. 1, § 21 (West 1970).
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 3 (internal citation omitted).
Id.at 4.
Id. at 3-4 (citing 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 710, 1218-19 (1956)).
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the 1968 iteration of the Florida Constitution,239 the court deemed
it “essential . . . that this Court consider whether or not the
Legislature is, in fact, empowered to abolish a common law and
statutory right of action without providing an adequate
alternative.”240 The court then went on to announce principles
that are germane to the workers’ compensation discussion:
Upon careful consideration of the requirements of
society, and the ever-evolving character of the law, we
cannot adopt a complete prohibition against such
legislative change. Nor can we adopt a view which
would allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional
and long-standing cause of action upon mere
legislative whim, or when an alternative approach is
available. . . . We hold, therefore, that where a right
of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating
the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such
right has become a part of the common law of the
State . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish
such a right without providing a reasonable
alternative to protect the rights of the people of the
State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature
can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method
of meeting such public necessity can be shown.241
Thus, as the argument goes in Padgett, because the workers’
compensation quid pro quo pre-dated the 1968 constitution, the
court must “not allow the Legislature to destroy a traditional and
long-standing cause of action upon mere legislative whim, or
when an alternative approach is available.”242 Further, workers’
compensation may not be abolished “unless the Legislature can
show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of
such right, and no alternative method for meeting such public
necessity can be shown.”243 The rejoinder to the argument is that
an amendment to the workers’ compensation statute is not an
abolishment. However, this begs the question of how far a statute
can be amended before it ceases to retain its essential character.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The peculiar character of Florida’s constitution, therefore,
makes it uniquely possible to argue that workers’ compensation
benefits—as a substitute for a longstanding tort remedy—may
not be abolished without providing a reasonable alternative
absent an “overpowering public necessity.”244 Other state courts
may of course be less inclined to place their thumbs on the scale
of “reasonable” alternatives when interpreting legislative
modifications of workers’ compensation statutes.245
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON STATE-SPECIFIC
CONTEXTS
Whether authorizing opt-out, as in Texas and Oklahoma,246
or enacting incremental-erosional changes in medical and
permanent partial incapacity benefits, as in Florida,247 states can
anticipate pushback by plaintiffs to workers’ compensation
benefit reduction. Because of the multijurisdictional character of
workers’ compensation law, both statutory modification and
opposition to change can take on a peculiarly local character, as
they have in the three states discussed in this Part. Nevertheless,
workers’ compensation law, despite being formally multi-state in
character, was originally instituted as a sweeping national
phenomenon.
Between 1910 and 1920, forty-three states enacted workers’
compensation statutes,248 a rate of implementation that would be
the envy of many federal statutes.249 With current total national
workers’ compensation expenditures at just under 60 billion
dollars per year,250 plaintiffs and defendants in various statutes
possess large incentives both to oppose and to support
modifications to workers’ compensation law, and, in accordance
with history, to move quickly. The remainder of this article
sketches the probable contours of legal argument surrounding
proposed changes to traditional workers’ compensation statutes,
premised on both state and federal constitutional law. These
arguments—which apply equally in other tort reform contexts—
will likely test the limits of legislative hegemony in the realm of

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
See infra Part IV.
See supra Part III. A., B.
See supra Part III. C.
FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 103-04.
Id. at 93-94, 100-01.
See 2016 Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index, supra note 79.
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personal injury rights and remedies, and plaintiffs will seek to
develop a framework of “rights” which may not be dispossessed
lightly.251 Part IV, infra, discusses state constitutional theories
germane to the restraint of state legislatures seeking to reform
personal injury law.
IV. STATE RESTRAINT: OPEN COURTS, RIGHT TO A
REMEDY, QUID PRO QUO
Challenges to significant changes in workers’ compensation
law are akin to even broader challenges to tort reform seeking to
reduce plaintiff remedies. Because workers’ compensation was
the personal injury substitute for tort,252 significant incursions on
workers’ compensation should be seen in the same way as
interference with tort. Assuming a court were to accept this
premise, the next question centers on the importance of the tort
right, or, of a right to remedy for personal injury generally.
The underlying question is whether a right to a remedy for
personal injury—whether in tort or workers’ compensation—is of
more than ordinary importance and whether that right’s
diminution by a legislature is sufficient to generate heightened
judicial scrutiny. Arguments that a right to a remedy for personal
injury should be treated as possessing such importance has
received vague support at the federal level.253 At the state level,
however, plaintiffs have occasionally made headway by arguing
that significant reduction or elimination of injury damages should
be evaluated by the judiciary with heightened scrutiny because
the rights in question are at least important under a state’s
constitution.254 One variation of the argument is that benefit
251. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 626 (“The law of redress is basic to our conception
of liberal-constitutional government, and was built into the fabric of our legal
system.”).
252. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 4.
253. Compare New York C.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917) (“[T]he whole
common-law doctrine of employer’s liability for negligence . . . is based upon fictions,
and is inapplicable to modern conditions of employment.”), with Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978) (rejecting tort-based challenge
to preemption under the Price-Anderson Act, repeating maxim that no one has a
vested right in a rule of common law), and Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Ohio
1991) (“[T]he statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under
which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective.”). See
also infra Part IV. C. (further discussing the holding in Morris), and infra Part V. A.
(discussing that Duke Power endorsed heightened judicial scrutiny of tort
modifications, while denying it was doing so).
254. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 840 (N.H. 1980) (citing Briscoe Co. v.
Rutgers, 327 A.2d 687, 690 (N.J. 1974), and Hunter v. North Mason Sch. Dist., 539
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reductions result in inadequate or unreasonably low
compensation,255 effecting a breach in the original “grand
bargain” or quid pro quo in which workers surrendered their tort
rights for reasonable alternative compensation.256 Another
variation of state constitutional argument centers on “right to a
remedy” provisions.257 As will be discussed in more detail
below,258 quid pro quo and “right to a remedy” theories are closely
related. Implicit in the concept of quid pro quo is the idea that it
would be impermissible to extinguish one right of the involved
kind without replacing it with another similar right because the
original right was important.259
Of course, plaintiffs have challenged limitations on tort
remedies on several other state constitutional theories, including
the denial of the right to a jury trial,260 and under provisions that
prohibit special legislation261 and require separation of
governmental powers.262 This Article addresses each of these
theories, but will focus on challenges centered on right to a
remedy and open courts, the quid pro quo category of due process,
and state constitutional equal protection.
A. RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND OPEN COURTS
“Right to a remedy” language is often located in the “open
courts” provision of state constitutions263 and has sometimes been
interpreted as ensuring a substantive remedy to litigants, rather
than merely guaranteeing that courthouse doors will remain open
to citizens.264 Right to a remedy and open court provisions have

P.2d 845, 848 (Wash. 1975)); see also infra Part IV. C.
255. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 64.
256. Padgett at 19-20. It is a question for another day whether workers in any
meaningful sense ever bargained; early twentieth century unions were involved in the
discussion, but I am not convinced that sufficiently large blocks of workers negotiated
for the eventful bargain. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 64-67.
257. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1309, 1310 (2003) (speech delivered by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas
“on February 28, 2002 for the annual Justice William J. Brennan Lecture on State
Courts and Social Justice at New York School of Law.”).
258. See infra Part IV. A.
259. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1335.
260. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 527 n.5.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1311.
264. Id. at 1310.
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ancient roots in the Magna Carta.265 The current right to a
remedy and open courts provision in the Pennsylvania
Constitution, for example, is a remnant of the ancient language:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.266
The ancient language itself read:
[E]very subject of this realme, for injury done to
him . . . by any other subject . . . without exception,
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and
have justice, and right for the injury done to him,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay.267
Some state courts have concluded, primarily in the context of
litigation over tort or medical malpractice reform,268 that the right
to remedy and open courts language in their constitutions means
that citizens should have a right to an adequate substantive
remedy.269 Some open courts provisions explicitly include the
phrase “right to a remedy,”270 but there are also variations to this
language.271 As already noted,272 Florida’s courts have decided
that Florida’s open courts provision establishes a doctrine of quid
pro quo, a requirement that “vested” rights may not be modified
265. Id. Or perhaps in one of its “restatements” by Sir Edward Coke in the
Institutes. Id. at 1311.
266. ART. 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11 (West 2011).
267. Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary ‘Right to a Remedy,’ 34 TRIAL 48, 49 (Mar.
1998) (quoting Edward Coke, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
England A6, 55-56 (E&R Brooke ed. 1797)).
268. Phillips, supra note 261, at 1332-34.
269. See, e.g., Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 365 (Utah 1989)
(concluding that arbitrary limit on tort damages awarded by juries impinged on both
the right to a remedy and right to a jury trial because it was the historic province of
the jury to award damages).
270. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1310.
271.
[There are] 27 state constitutions that require courts to be open, 36
that require justice to be administered promptly, 27 that require
justice to be administered without purchase or sale, 34 that require
justice to be granted completely and/or without denial, and 11 that
require justice to be delivered freely. Additionally, 35 sates provide
a right to a remedy, of which 21 require the remedy to be by due
process or due course of law.
Id. at n.5 (citing 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES app. 6 at 6-65 to 6-67 (3d ed. 2000)).
272. See supra Part III. C.
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unless a reasonable remedy is substituted for them.273 Because
some states afford citizens the practical equivalent of vested
rights to remedies, some notable commentators have opined that
individual rights are, at times, better protected by state
constitutions than by their federal counterpart.274
“Right to a remedy” and open courts arguments were
featured prominently in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.275 In
the case, a truck shop lube technician alleged that his employer
“negligently allowed acid laden mist and fumes to drift into the
shop area where [he] worked, causing harm to his respiratory
system, skin, teeth, and joints.”276 The technician filed a workers’
compensation claim, which was denied by his employer’s
insurance carrier.277 Ultimately the Workers’ Compensation
Board of the State of Oregon upheld the denial,278 finding that the
technician’s work was not the “major contributing cause of his
injuries”279 and that he did not have “compensable injury” under
the workers’ compensation statute.280
Additionally, the
technician could not bring a tort suit because of the exclusive
remedy rule, and the trial court dismissed his complaint when he
tried to do so.281 Thus, the technician in Smothers was in the same
position as the Florida plaintiffs in Westphal and Kluger. Each of
these plaintiffs was completely cut off from any remedy for
personal injury,282 in a sense of conceptually easier scenario than
one in which the “adequacy” of a remedy is under dispute.283
273. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973).
274. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
275. 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001). The case was overturned as this Article went to press
in Horton v. Oregon Health and Science University, —P.3d—, 359 Or. 168 (Or. 2016).
However, the author is of the opinion that the case will continue to be influential in
the back-and-forth arguments surrounding the limits of legislative supremacy over
tort reform. The case will undoubtedly continue to be an example in Oregon and
elsewhere, so its close analysis in this article will be retained.
276. The appellate court chronicled the facts in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer,
Inc., 941 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Or. App. 1997).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Smothers, 941 P.2d at 1066; Westphal, 122 So.3d at 443; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at
5.
283. Similarly, Oklahoma employees of opt-out employers may credibly argue that
they have been dispossessed of a legal remedy for injury because there is no legal
requirement under Oklahoma law that alternative benefit plans pay any specific
amount or level of benefits.
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On appeal, the technician in Smothers argued that the court’s
application of the Oregon exclusive remedy rule violated, among
other things, the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.284
The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the argument, stating:
The question in this case is whether the legislature,
when it amended [the exclusive remedy rule],
intended to declare that a work-related harm that is
outside the definition of “compensable injury” in [the
workers’ compensation statute] is not a “legally
cognizable” injury. If that was its intention, then
there is no “right” on which a “deprivation of a remedy”
argument could be predicated.285
The appellate court’s response went directly to the heart of
the matter: the only “rights” in question were statutory workers’
compensation and tort rights,286 and, if the legislature wanted to
extinguish either or both sets of rights, it had plenary power to do
so.287 While it could not, of course, create a right and then deny a
remedy,288 this was not the situation. While there may be no right
without a remedy, there is also no remedy without a right.289
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s
decision in Smothers290 in the only way logically possible. The
court found the existence of a substantive right in the remedies
clause of the state constitution291 and drew on a great deal of
history in doing so.292 The argument has been that Magna Carta
and the history of open courts and remedies provisions293 did not
appear out of thin air. As Thomas Phillips wrote, one of the most
widespread and important of state constitutional provisions is the
“right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy for injury.”294 The

284. The Oregon Constitution states: “No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every
man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. CONST. Art. I, § 10 (West 2014).
285. Smothers, 941 P.2d at 1068.
286. Id. at 1067.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1068.
289. Professor Bauman refers to this as a “circular maxim.” John H. Bauman,
Remedies in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 237, 281 (1991).
290. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 363 (Or. 2001).
291. Id.at 339.
292. Id. at 340.
293. Id. at 341.
294. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1310.
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right to a remedy for injury derives from Magna Carta,295 and the
seventeenth century articulation of it from Lord Coke may be
found in the constitutions of eleven states.296
The Oregon Supreme Court, as well as numerous scholars,
have traced a taxonomy of rights—that would have been familiar
to the founders, adopters of the early remedy provisions297—to
Blackstone’s Commentaries,298 in which the rights of persons at
common law were divided into “absolute” and “relative” rights.299
Among the absolute rights were those of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property.300 Absolute rights,
according to Blackstone, could not be protected simply by
declaring them; they had to be subject to vindication.301 The
“right to a remedy” was one of five subordinate rights allowing
vindication of absolute rights.302 Once a person suffered injury to
one of those rights, an “adequate remedy” automatically
attached.303
The Blackstone formulation was not conceived as a “due
process” protection because the threat of encroachment on rights
arose from the Crown and from private actors, not from the
legislature.304 Nevertheless, the right to a remedy existed within
Blackstone’s “natural law” rights taxonomy.305 Phillips has
argued persuasively that early-American tort cases were
consistent with Blackstone’s absolute-relative right model:
In most early American cases, the courts were willing
to supply a remedy for every right, whether created by
common law or statute. But they were not bound to
295. Id.
296. “That every person for every injury done him in his goods, land or person,
ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land and ought to have justice
and right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.” Id. at 1311.
297. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 350.
298. Id. at 342.
299. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1321 n.42.
300. Id.
301. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 63 (2d ed. 1884).
302. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1321.
303. BLACKSTONE, supra note 301, at 68.
304. But see Lord Coke’s controversial Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
652; 8 Co. Rep. 113 b, 118 a (ruling that “[I]n many cases, the common law will control
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act
of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.”).
305. Phillips, supra note 257, at 1331.
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preserve any particular remedy or procedure for
vindicating the right. As long as the new law
preserved the injured person’s ability to vindicate his
or her rights in court or provided an adequate
substitute remedy, the right to a remedy was not
violated. The courts also allowed legislatures to limit
remedies derived from relative law, such as
respondeat superior, in part because the injured
person retained the right to obtain a judicial remedy
against the individual who caused the injury, that is,
the individual who violated the injured person’s
absolute right to personal security.306
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Smothers followed a similar
line of reasoning.307 It was the business of the court to trace the
“right to a remedy” clause from its apparent origins in Magna
Carta, through Lord Coke, William Blackstone, the early
colonists, the Founders, and ultimately, back to the Oregon
Constitution.308 It is a long story,309 at the culmination of which
the court concluded:
As we have explained, the history of the remedy clause
indicates that its purpose is to protect absolute
common-law rights respecting person, property, and
reputation, as those rights existed when the Oregon
Constitution was drafted in 1857. The means for
protecting those rights is the mandate that remedy by
due course of law be available in the event of injury.310
From that resolution, it was a short step for the court to
conclude that Smothers had been deprived of his remedy.311
Then, the court conceptually went one step further: not only was
it impermissible to deprive a citizen of a remedy, it was equally
impermissible to deprive him of a plainly inadequate remedy.312
The court acknowledged the right of the legislature to alter law,
but imposed a limitation:
Although this court has held that the remedy clause
preserves common-law rights of action, it never has
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 350 (Or. 2001).
Id. at 340-46.
And one that is beyond the scope of my present inquiry. For a concise and
penetrating account, see generally Goldberg, supra note 33, at 560-68.
310. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 353.
311. Id.at 362.
312. Id.
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held that the remedy clause prohibits the legislature
from changing a common-law remedy or form of
procedure, attaching conditions precedent to invoking
the remedy, or perhaps even abolishing old remedies
and substituting new remedies. That is, the court
never has held that the remedy clause freezes in place
common-law remedies.
However, just as the
legislature cannot deny a remedy entirely for injury to
constitutionally protected common-law rights, neither
can it substitute an “emasculated remedy” that is
incapable of restoring the right that has been
injured.313
This line of thought reveals a conceptual linchpin between
right to a remedy and quid pro quo. The remedy may be altered—
adjusted for historical circumstances—but the right may not be
annihilated, for it is absolute.314 Many courts have refined or
disagreed with this line of reasoning. As Jennifer Friesen has
explained:
At least three theoretical positions can be discerned
from the various “tests” announced: the historically
tied approach, the “reasonable alternative” public
policy approach, and the legislative power approach.
The historically tied approach holds that the [open
courts and remedies] clauses protect only common law
causes of action that existed at the time of the
adoption of the constitutional clause, which are
preserved unless the legislature substitutes another
adequate remedy or “quid pro quo” for the affected
litigants. The public policy approach permits the
legislature to limit any cause of action and remedy if
it creates a reasonable alternative, but, even without
creating a substitute, it may alter former rights if it
acts for a very important reason or is responding to an
overwhelming public need. The third theory allows
legislatures the broadest power to alter common law
rights and remedies by redefining the notion of legal
injury.315

313. Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted).
314. Id. at 362.
315. FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9. For examples of the historically tied
approach, see Bryant v. Cont’l Conveyor & Equip. Co., 751 P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. 1988),
and Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 77 N.W. 174, 175 (Wis. 1898). For examples
of the public policy approach, see Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634,
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Utilization of this rubric reveals opinions form Florida and
Oregon already discussed as undertaking primarily “historicallytied approaches.”316
Challenges to opt-out and significant
incremental-erosional modifications to workers’ compensation
statutes would likely have the greatest success in those
jurisdictions in which courts have been sympathetic to such
historical arguments within tort reform contexts. Smothers, for
example, utilized a historically-tied approach to both presume
that the essence of a common law right to a remedy must be
preserved and to insist that any substitute remedy be adequate.317
The “public policy” approach may also be useful to opponents
of opt-out and incremental-erosional workers’ compensation
modifications, because it requires that remedial substitutes for
rights be “reasonable.”318 However, this approach leaves open the
possibility that substitution may lawfully be “unreasonable” when
the legislature is acting for an important reason or responding to
an overwhelming public need.319 The question in these situations
may be whether the burden is on the government to demonstrate
the existence or severity of the public need. Finally, if a
jurisdiction’s courts utilize the “legislative power” approach, it
does not appear that adequacy or reasonableness will enter into
those courts’ analyses.320
Nevertheless, in all but legislative power jurisdictions, it
would seem likely that opt-out challengers prefer development of
a historically-tied narrative. As Professor John Bauman argued,
states in which this approach is undertaken are, in reality:
[S]ubjecting the statute to a form of substantive due
process review. In substantive due process review, the
court scrutinizes both the goal of the legislation, to
determine whether the statute deals with a matter of
legitimate (or even compelling) government interest,
and then tests whether the means chosen are properly
related to achieving that goal.321
It is likely true, as Professor Bauman has also observed, that

645 (W. Va. 1991), and Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877,
884-85 (W. Va. 1991). For an example of the legislative power approach, see Meech v.
Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 493 (Mont. 1989).
316. See Smothers, 23 P.3 at 338, and Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
317. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 362.
318. Id. at 360.
319. FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9.
320. FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9.
321. Bauman, supra note 289, at 262.
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“[t]he common law is not divine revelation, but rather a human
artifact consciously chosen”322 and that “it is hard to decide
exactly what ‘common law’ is made fundamental by the [remedy]
provision.”323 However, courts using historically-tied approaches
to remedies provisions appear to be employing a kind of
originalism in discerning state-based absolute rights in the
Blackstonian tradition. They are in a historical “construction
zone” and arrive at such a point because “[c]onstruction becomes
the focus of explicit attention when the meaning of the
constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that meaning
are contested.”324 Within that construction zone, the historical
peculiarities of states are of significance and have predictably
been creatively exploited. One imagines this venture will
continue, particularly as scholarship matures on the origins of the
“right to a remedy” and open courts provisions.
Theories of legislative supremacy, on the other hand,
challenge historically-tied attempts to ward off tort reform.325
These theories hold that the authority of the legislature should
govern absolutely in all areas not explicitly closed off by
constitutional guarantee.326
In a legislative supremacy
environment, no personal injury litigant will get anywhere unless
persuading a court of explicit guarantees of remedies for personal
injury,327 which will not exist. In Meech v. Hillhaven West,328 for
example, the plaintiff sought damages for wrongful termination,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, for
allegedly oppressive, malicious, unjustifiable conduct by his
employer, and ultimately for wrongful discharge.329 Montana had
enacted the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act,330 which,
by its terms, “preempted” common law remedies.331 The plaintiff
in Meech challenged the statutory preemption of his tort claims
on several grounds, including those under Montana’s unified

322. Id. at 283.
323. Id.
324. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 22
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469 (2013).
325. FRIESEN, supra note 271, at § 6-2(c), 6-9 and accompanying text.
326. FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-9.
327. FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-8.
328. 776 P.2d 488, 488 (Mont. 1989).
329. Id. at 490.
330. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (2015).
331. Meech, 776 P.2d at 490.
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constitutional “right to a remedy” and “open courts” provision.332
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument out of hand:
The legislature’s exercise of its power to alter the
common law supports in a large part our legal
system. . . . [M]uch of the legislation altering the
common law concerns the legislature’s decisions on the
remedies, redress, or damages obtainable in carious
causes of action. . . . Legislative decisions to expand
liability to further various policy objectives are
debated and passed almost routinely . . . for a variety
of policy reasons, refuses to provide a cause of action,
remedy and redress for every injury. This proposition
is expressed in Latin as damnum absque injuria,
meaning a “loss which does not give rise to an action
for damages against the person causing it.” The
legislation at issue here similarly alters common-law
rights and duties and arguably denies a cause of
action, remedy, and redress for injuries recognized at
common law. If Article II, § 16, guarantees a
fundamental right to full legal redress as embodied in
common-law causes of action, then a myriad of
legislation altering common law in a restrictive
manner, as well as the Act, denies this fundamental
right.333
This is a robust statement of legislative supremacy.
Essentially, the court held that, assuming the underlying
substantive tort right is, or might at one time have been,
considered “fundamental,” the legislature nevertheless had
plenary authority to abolish it.334 Under this view, no right is
absolute.
Of course, courts need not—and at times have not—conceded
that open courts or remedies provisions have any substantive
component at all. It is worth noting that Oklahoma itself does not
view the remedies clause as providing substance, so opt-out
challengers there may find little solace in proceeding on such a
theory. In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.,335 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, in connection with the state constitutional remedy
provision, stated:
332. Id.
333. Id. at 495-96 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 345
(4th ed. 1979)).
334. Id. at 493-94.
335. 162 P. 938 (Okla. 1917).
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That this was a mandate to the judiciary and was not
intended as a limitation upon the legislative branch of
the government seems clear. Neither do we think it
was intended to preserve a particular remedy for given
causes of action in any certain court of the state, nor
was it intended to deprive the Legislature of the power
to abolish remedies for future accruing causes of action
(where not otherwise specifically prohibited), or to
create new remedies for other wrongs as in its wisdom
it might determine.336
A number of states see matters in much the same way.337
And, whether the remedies provision may be used to imply a
substantive personal injury right of redress requires a state-bystate assessment.
B. STATE QUID PRO QUO
Quid pro quo is essentially a due process concept.338
Therefore, this article will address the theory in that manner,
reserving traditional due process analysis for the next Part on
federal theories of restraint.339 In the federal context, it may be
worth noting that the Supreme Court implicitly created quid pro
quo as a matter of federal due process in White and failed to reject
the theory in the case of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group.340
Some states have adopted and developed the quid pro quo
theory341—that remedy for loss of an “important” common law
right may not be dissolved by a legislature without provision of an
adequate substitute,342 which may take on different forms. In
Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell,343 for example, the
plaintiffs challenged medical malpractice caps and a requirement
that they take future damages over time in the form of an

336. Id.at 942.
337. FRIESEN, supra note 271, § 6-2(c), 6-6.
338. Jeffrey P. DeGraffenreid, Testing the Constitutionality of Tort Reform with a
Quid Pro Quo Analysis: Is Kansas’ Judicial Approach an Adequate Substitute for a
More Traditional Constitutional Requirement?, 31 WASHBURN L. J. 314, 316 (1992).
339. See infra Part V.
340. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
341. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
342. Id.
343. 757 P.2d 251, 253 (Kan. 1988), disapproved but not reversed, Bair v. Peck, 811
P.2d 1176, 1991 (1991).
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annuity.344 Setting its mood point in prefatory language, the court
said:
The Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution and the
Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution are
there to protect every citizen, including a person who
has no clout, and the little guy on the block. They are
there to protect the rights of a brain-damaged baby, a
quadriplegic farmer or business executive, and a
horribly disfigured housewife who is a victim of
medical malpractice. They are not there to see that
the will of the majority is carried out, but to protect
the rights of the minority. It is the obligation of this
court in each case to carry out its constitutional
responsibility. With that obligation in mind, we now
turn to the issues involved in the case now before us.345
Tracing a long line of Kansas cases,346 the court set out a twostep analysis in which it first determined whether the plaintiff’s
right to a remedy had been limited.347 Then, finding that it had
been limited,348 the court moved on to assess whether the plaintiff
had, notwithstanding the limitation, received from the legislature
an adequate substitution remedy.349 The court found that he had
not.350
In Texas Workers’ Compensation v. Garcia,351 the Texas
Supreme Court considered a broad attack on the constitutionality
of the 1989 amendment of the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act.352 Various plaintiffs alleged that “provisions of the Texas
Workers’ Compensation Act facially violate[d] the Texas
Constitution’s guarantees of open courts, due course of law, equal
protection, jury trial, and obligation of contract.”353 The lower
courts sustained a majority of the challenges and struck the Texas

344. Bell, 757 P.2d at 255.
345. Id. at 258.
346. The court utilized a quid pro quo analysis as far back as 1914 when it upheld
against an employee challenge the original Kansas workers’ compensation statute. In
a sense, current tort reform challenges were second-generation quid pro quo attacks
on negligence limitation. Id. at 263.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 260.
351. 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995).
352. Id. at 516.
353. Id. at 510.
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Act.354 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, but importantly,
accepted the premise that any modification of the workers’
compensation statute had to be reasonable in substituting
statutory for common law remedies:
[L]egislative
action
withdrawing
common-law
remedies for well-established common-law causes of
action for injuries to one’s “lands, goods, person or
reputation” is sustained only when it is reasonable in
substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable
exercise of the police power in the interest of the
general welfare.355
The court concluded that it “must compare the current
statute to the common law remedy, not to the previous statute.
The open courts provision guarantees that a common law remedy
will not be unreasonably abridged, not that the Legislature will
not amend or replace a statute.”356 Thus, the court agreed on the
critical quid pro quo point. However, the court nevertheless
upheld the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act under the essential
open courts challenge.357 The gravamen of the court’s argument
was that in a majority of cases—even under modern negligence
doctrine—injured workers could easily fail to prevail in negligence
cases and the record in the current case suggested to the court
that workers would recover nothing in negligence in a large
majority of cases:
Although the Legislature has softened the defense of
contributory negligence by adopting comparative
responsibility, and this Court has abolished the
defense of assumption of the risk, an injured employee
pursuing the common law remedy must still prove
that the employer was negligent and that he or she
was not more than 50 percent negligent. Although the
trial court made no finding on the issue, there was
evidence at trial that, even with these changes in the
common law, injured employees pursuing negligence
claims against their employers recover nothing in a
large majority of cases. In comparison, the Act—

354. Id.at 516-17.
355. Id. at 520, citing Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d
259, 262 (Tex. 1994) (quoting Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex.
19555)); accord Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983), and Waites v.
Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1977).
356. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 521.
357. Id. at 523.
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carrying forward the general scheme of the former
act—provides benefits to injured workers without the
necessity of proving negligence and without regard to
the employer’s potential defenses. In exchange, the
benefits are more limited than the actual damages
recoverable at common law. We believe this quid pro
quo, which produces a more limited but more certain
recovery, renders the Act an adequate substitute for
purposes of the open courts guarantee.358
This contention by the court nicely underscores the dilemma
faced by injured workers’ advocates advancing quid pro quo
arguments. A court may conclude that the remedy for a quid pro
quo “gone bad” is to return to the negligence status quo ante. In
fact, this was precisely the conclusion reached by the Florida trial
judge in Padgett.359 However, if the court in Garcia is correct,
returning to the status quo ante might not be a good thing for
plaintiffs. Ultimately, the Garcia court’s argument likely proves
too much. Employers and their insurance carriers, having had
the benefit of much more employer-friendly tort laws in the early
twentieth century, were sufficiently concerned about the prospect
of successful employee negligence suits to become proponents of
workers’ compensation laws.360 It seems difficult to suggest that
negligence law is better for employers now than it was in 1910.
Though plaintiffs may experience significant difficulty in making
out negligence claims, employers continue to be liable for possibly
crippling damage claims, only one of which may be sufficient for
an employer to redevelop a preference for insurance premiums.
Nevertheless, while the plaintiffs in Garcia may have lost the
tactical contest they may have won a strategic victory. Time will
tell.361
Taking a different approach from the Texas court in Garcia,
on the other hand, the California Supreme Court, in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,362 appeared to doubt the independent
existence under due process of a quid pro quo requirement.363 In
Fein, an attorney who was suffering from a heart attack had been

358. Id. at 521 (internal citations omitted).
359. Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
13, 2014) (dismissed on procedural grounds).
360. FISHBACK & KANTOR, A PRELUDE, supra note 56, at 13.
361. On the other hand, if negligence cases are routinely shunted into arbitration,
the underlying doctrinal question may not be addressed.
362. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
363. Id. at 681-82, n. 18.
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misdiagnosed on several occasions as experiencing only muscle
spasms.364
The attorney, who suffered harm from the
misdiagnosis, sued in tort.365 The attorney prevailed at trial, but,
under a tort reform statute, was limited to noneconomic damages
of $250,000.366 The California Supreme Court rejected several
challenges to this limitation, concluding that the legislature’s
decision to limit noneconomic liability was not irrational.367 In a
footnote to its decision, the Court suggested both that a quid pro
quo theory was not applicable to its analysis and that its
application to the case would not have changed the outcome.368
“Indeed, even if due process principles required some ‘quid pro
quo’ to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the
preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry
in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the
legislation imposes on malpractice plaintiffs.”369 This statement
exemplifies a “societal quid pro quo” argument: although the
individual plaintiff may suffer, society as a whole, and, perhaps
the plaintiff in other circumstances, benefits.370 An illustrative
societal quid pro quo argument is that tort reform may lead to
lower aggregate health care costs despite having an adverse
impact on an individual plaintiff in a particular case.371
Some courts, of course, reject quid pro quo unapologetically,
holding that the common law of England was “merely statutory”
and thus modifiable at will by a legislature.372 Where the common
364. Id.at 669.
365. Id.at 670.
366. “The jury awarded $24,733 for wages lost by plaintiff to the time of trial,
$63,000 for future medical expenses, and $700,000 for wages lost in the future as a
result of the reduction in plaintiff’s life expectancy. Finally, the jury awarded $500,000
for ‘noneconomic damages,’ to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment and other intangible damages sustained by plaintiff from the time of the
injury until his death.” Id.at 670.
367. Id. at 678.
368. Id. at 681-82, n. 18.
369. Id. The court seemed to be utilizing a societal quid pro quo argument, and
appeared to understand the U.S. Supreme Court as having done the same thing in
Duke Power.
370. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988) (rejecting
argument).
371. See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976).
372. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 74 (Neb.
2003). See generally Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906 (Mo. 1992),
overruled on other grounds, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo.
2012) (“[T]he Texas-Florida interpretation views the common law as an inviolate body
of law, rather than as a starting point from which judicial declarations are subject to
modification by legislative policy choices and subsequent judicial decisions necessary

DUFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

STATE’S AUTHORITY TO OPT-OUT

10/22/2016 9:39 AM

177

law has not been supplanted by statute, some courts argue that
reading the open courts and remedy provisions as a limitation on
legislative power would have the effect of reifying the law as of
the date of adoption of the provisions373 (some of which were not
enacted until the gilded age)374 and, one might note, at some
distance from Coke, Blackstone, and Magna Carta. These cases
seem to assume that recognition of due process quid pro quo or a
constitutional right to a remedy for injury means that the
legislature would be absolutely prevented from modifying or
abolishing a remedy.
As Tracy Thomas argued: “As a
fundamental right . . . the right to a remedy can still be denied if
that denial is necessary to a compelling state interest.”375
In sum, states vary significantly as to how or whether they
recognize quid pro quo due process, and it is difficult to formulate
general, multistate conclusions about the viability of the theory.
C. STATE EQUAL PROTECTION
Another constitutional theory that opt-out challengers may
attempt to utilize in challenging severe limitations to personal
injury remedies is equal protection. Most states follow the federal
courts’ approach to equal protection analysis.376 On the easiest
rendering of federal law, because the right to a recovery for
physical injury has not been deemed fundamental, and because
physically injured workers or persons do not make up a
traditional suspect or quasi-suspect classification,377 state laws
to meet the needs of a changing society.”)
373. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 404-05 (Idaho 1976) (rejecting quid
pro quo altogether and adopting the reasoning of the Colorado courts: that because the
state constitution did not adopt the common law of England, the state may modify it
at will).
374. For example, Colorado’s Constitution was ratified in 1876, Idaho’s in 1890,
Kansas’ in 1861, Nevada’s in 1864, and South Dakota’s in 1889. See generally, ROBERT
L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 45, 98, 135, 242, 364 (1998).
375. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a
Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2004).
376. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202-04 (1976) (striking on equal protection
grounds an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of “nonintoxicating” 3.2% beer to
males under the age of 21, but allowing females over the age of 18 to purchase it, and
clarifying the modern tripartite equal protection analysis).
377. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 997
(2002) (“In sum, equal protection incorporation would certainly treat as presumptively
suspect discrimination based on religion, state origin, race, color, previous condition of
servitude, and sex. The version of equal protection incorporation that I favor would
also treat age discrimination as suspect, and might apply to some laws that
disadvantage the poor as well. A remaining question is whether adopting equal
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applicable to them are subject only to deferential rational basis
review.378 The U.S. Supreme Court has directly addressed this
rational basis review, opining that “[i]n areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds
along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”379 However, not all state
courts take this path with respect to interpretation of the equal
protection provisions of their own constitutions.
In Carson v. Mauer,380 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
took the view that “the right to recover for personal injuries is . . .
an important substantive right,”381 when it struck several
provisions of a medical malpractice statute.382 Among challenges
to the statute was that it violated equal protection under the state
constitution.383 The court reaffirmed that, just as was the case
with federal court review of the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, it would not “[i]n the absence of a ‘suspect
classification’ or a ‘fundamental right’ . . . second-guess the
legislature as to the wisdom of or necessity for legislation.”384
Thus, the court accepted the factual predicates upon which the
legislature has concluded that medical malpractice reform was
protection incorporation means that no categories beyond those expressly singled out
by the constitutional text are presumptively invalid.”)
378. Id. at 1016.
379. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (citations omitted).
380. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), reaffirmed by Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232,
1233 (N.H. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc. v. City of
Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 2007).
381. Carson, 424 A.2d at 830.
382. The Court stated:
The statute in question is part of an effort by the legislature to
address the problems of the medical injury reparations system. In
enacting [the statute], the legislature set forth rigorous standards
for qualified expert testimony, created a two-year statute of
limitations applicable to most medical malpractice actions, required
that notice of intent to sue be given at least sixty days before
commencing the action, prohibited the statement of the total
damages claimed as an ad damnum or otherwise, abolished the
collateral source rule, limited the amount of damages recoverable
for non-economic loss to $250,000, empowered the court to order
periodic payments of any future damages in excess of $50,000, and
established a contingent fee scale for attorneys in medical
malpractice actions.
Id. at 829.
383. Id. at 831.
384. Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
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necessary.385 The Carson court also acknowledged that the U.S.
Supreme Court had applied a “substantial relationship” test—a
requirement that statutory classifications rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation—only “to cases involving classifications based
upon gender and illegitimacy.”386 Nevertheless, the Carson court
concluded:
Although the right to recover for personal injuries is
not a “fundamental right,” it is nevertheless an
important substantive right. In Estate of Cargill v.
City of Rochester . . . we applied the rational basis test
in evaluating classifications which, like those in [the
statutory provision under review], place restrictions
on an individual’s right to recover in tort. We now
conclude, however, that the rights involved herein are
sufficiently important to require that the restrictions
imposed on those rights be subjected to a more
rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the
rational basis test.387
While the court recognized that it was applying a scrutiny
exceeding that applied in connection with Equal Protection review
under the U.S. Constitution,388 the majority stated: “[W]e are not
confined to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant
individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution
requires.”389 According to the court, the middle-level tier of review
under which encroachments on personal injury rights had to be
assessed required that legislation be “reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”390
Although Carson has subsequently been reversed on other
grounds,391 the “important substantive right” formulation

385. Id.
386. Id. (citations omitted).
387. Id. at 830 (citing Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 667
(1979).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 831 (citations omitted).
390. Gonya v. Comm’r N.H. Ins. Dep’t, 899 A.2d 278, 289 (N.H. 2006) (citing
Carson, 424 A.2d at 831).
391. Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H.
2007) (clarifying that the government had “[t]he burden [of] demonstrat[ing] that the
challenged legislation meets this [intermediate scrutiny] test. . . . [and] may not rely
upon justifications that are hypothesized or ‘invented post hoc in response to litigation,’
nor upon ‘overbroad generalizations.’”) (citations omitted).
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continues to trigger intermediate scrutiny in New Hampshire.392
Thus, legislative enactment of workers’ compensation opt-out, in
conjunction with retaining the exclusive remedy rule, would
almost certainly face heightened judicial scrutiny in New
Hampshire by requiring the state government to justify the de
facto elimination of the workers’ compensation remedy.
Not all state courts agree that the right to recover for
personal injuries is sufficiently important to trigger heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection provisions of their state
constitutions when the right suffers interference. In Morris v.
Savoy,393 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a
constitutional challenge to a medical malpractice statute.394
Although it struck two of the challenged provisions on due process
grounds,395 the court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection
challenge.396 In the due process portion of its analysis, the court
held that the statute was “unconstitutional because it does not
bear a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare
and further because it is unreasonable and arbitrary.”397 The
court nevertheless rejected the equal protection challenge because
“the statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of
facts under which the classification rationally furthered a
legitimate legislative objective.”398 These conclusions seem more
than a little inconsistent. The Carson court399 had also been
willing to unflinchingly accept the legislative facts that
surrounded the involved statute’s enactment, as it
simultaneously rejected as arbitrary the conclusions flowing from
those facts.400 Apparently, irrational application of presumptively
valid facts can provide sufficient reason for rejecting legislative
392. Carson, 424 A.2d at 830. See also Gonya, 899 A.2d at 289.
393. 576 N.W.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
394. Id. at 767. The challenge was to certain liability caps and the imposition of a
collateral source rule. Id.
395. Id. at 771.
396. Id. at 772
397. Id. at 771.
398. Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
399. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
400. The Court stated:
[A] statute which singles out seriously injured malpractice victims
whose future damages exceed $50,000 and requires one class to
shoulder the burden inherent in a periodic payments scheme from
which the general public benefits offends basic notions of fairness
and justice. . . . [and] is an unreasonable exercise of the legislature’s
police power and violates the State’s equal protection guarantees.
Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
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conclusions, but the principle is somewhat confounding.
Morris may be more indicative of how state courts are
presently likely to analyze equal protection challenges.401 In
workers’ compensation contexts there have been few successful
equal protection challenges by plaintiffs or defendants.402 The
reason for this is likely that the public policy rationale at the time
of the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes would have
survived what we now call strict scrutiny, let alone survive more
deferential standards of review.403 The major defect with respect
to equal protection analysis is its all-or-nothing character under
either the strict scrutiny or rational basis tests. As Laurence
Tribe has written in explaining why some courts have taken the
New Hampshire intermediate scrutiny approach displayed in
Carson:
[An] all-or-nothing choice between minimum
rationality and strict scrutiny ill-suits the broad range
of situations arising under the equal protection clause,
many of which are best dealt with neither through the
virtual rubber-stamp of truly minimal review nor

401. Morris itself cites several cases, which declined to apply heightened scrutiny
on an equal protection theory. See, e.g., Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 763
P.2d 1153, 1159, 1161 (N.M. 1998); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534
(Va. 1989); and Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (Ind. 1980).
402. But see Vasquez, CM-2014-11060L (Okla. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n) (Feb. 26,
2016), and supra note 139 (striking Oklahoma’s Injury Benefit Act at the
administrative level in part on equal protection grounds).
403. As John Fabian Witt wrote in The Accidental Republic, the workplace injury
situation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was dire:
At the turn of the century, one worker in fifty was killed or disabled
for at least four weeks each year because of a work-related accident.
Among the population as a whole, roughly one in every thousand
Americans died in an accident each year. For those who worked in
dangerous industries, accident rates were considerably higher. In
1890 alone, one railroad worker in every three hundred was killed
on the job; among freight railroad brakemen, one out of a hundred
died in work accidents. Nonfatal accident rates, though more
difficult to estimate, appear to have been much higher. By one
contemporary estimate, no fewer than 42 percent of railroad
workers involved in the day-to-day operation of trains in the state
of Colorado were injured on the job each year. The most
extraordinary rates of death and injury appear to have occurred in
the anthracite coal mines of eastern Pennsylvania during the 1850s
and 1860s, where each year 6 percent of the workforce was killed, 6
percent permanently crippled, and 6 percent seriously but
temporarily disabled.
JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 2-3 (2004).
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through the virtual death-blow of truly strict scrutiny,
but through methods more sensitive to risks of
injustice than the former and yet less blind to the
needs of governmental flexibility than the latter.404
Ultimately, most courts employing equal protection analysis
would probably defer to legislative fact-finding, a development
likely to put plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage. Courts may
accept, uncritically, legislative fact-finding asserting that
workers’ compensation modifications—such as opt-out—are
economically beneficial. If those courts also apply deferential
rational basis review, it is less likely that legislative fact
determinations would be disturbed. If, however, legislatures had
the burden of showing a substantial relationship between the
policy problem and the chosen legislative solution, cases might
receive a very different judicial reception. For example, if
alternative benefit plans under opt-out deliver fewer benefits to
injured workers—particularly to those who are permanently
disabled—then the increased costs to workers must either be
absorbed by workers or shifted elsewhere. Courts might then
insist on an explanation of states’ analyses of such large problems.
On the other hand, a court might strike a tort-reform statute
even under a “bare” rational basis analysis. To illustrate, in
Estate of McCall v. United States,405 the Florida Supreme Court
struck Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic
damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action.406 In that
case, decedent died as a result of negligent medical treatment
during and after childbirth by Air Force medical personnel.407
The plaintiffs, decedent’s survivors, alleged medical malpractice
and filed a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.408 The court found the United States liable and that the
plaintiffs’ economic and noneconomic damages were $980,462.40
and $2 million, respectively.409 Notwithstanding these findings,
the court limited the plaintiffs’ recovery of wrongful death
noneconomic damages to $1 million in accordance with Florida’s
statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on

404. Richardson, 763 P.2d at 1163 (emphasis omitted), citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1609-10 (2d ed. 1988).
405. 134 So.3d 894 (Fla. 2014).
406. Id. at 903.
407. Id. at 898-899.
408. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (2008).
409. Estate of McCall, 134 So.3d at 899.
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medical malpractice claims.410 The court also denied a motion
challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s wrongful death
statutory cap under both the Florida and United States
Constitutions.411 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court
of Appeals,412 the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings,413
and, specifically contended that the statutory cap violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.414 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed application of the Florida damages
cap,415 but granted a motion to certify four questions to the Florida
Supreme Court, including the question of whether the cap
violated equal protection.416 The Florida Supreme Court struck
the cap under equal protection analysis, applying the rational
basis test:
[The cap] has the effect of saving a modest amount for
many by imposing devastating costs on a few—those
who are most grievously injured, those who sustain
the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants
for whom judicially determined noneconomic damages
are subject to division and reduction simply based
upon the existence of the cap. Under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution . . . we
hold that to reduce damages in this fashion is not only
arbitrary, but irrational, and we conclude that it
“offends the fundamental notion of equal justice under
the law.”417
In an unusual dissection of legislative findings, the court
went to some lengths to dispute the existence of a medical
malpractice crisis, a cross examination culminating in the
following statement:
Thus, even if there had been a medical malpractice
crisis in Florida at the turn of the century, the current
data reflects that it has subsided. No rational basis
currently exists (if it ever existed) between the cap
imposed . . . and any legitimate state purpose. . . . At
the time, the cap on noneconomic damages serves no
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903 (citation omitted).
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purpose other than to arbitrarily punish the most
grievously injured or their surviving family members.
Moreover, it has never been demonstrated that there
was a proper predicate for imposing the burden of
supporting the Florida legislative scheme upon the
shoulders of the persons and families who have been
most severely injured and died as a result of medial
negligence. Health care policy that relies upon
discrimination against Florida families is not rational
or reasonable when it attempts to utilize aggregate
caps
to
create
unreasonable
classifications.
Accordingly, and for each of these reasons, the cap on
wrongful death noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice actions does not pass constitutional
muster.418
Litigants in an equal protection jurisdiction like Florida
could expect a lively contest of workers’ compensation opt-out to
the extent it both maintained the exclusive remedy rule and
denied access to a workers’ compensation statute.
D. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON STATE RESTRAINT
The foregoing discussion disclosed a great deal of variation
on state judicial responses to plaintiffs’ attempts at restraining
legislative initiatives to reduce personal injury remedies. Not
surprisingly, this kind of variation has led to a corresponding
variation in litigation environments for both tort and workers’
compensation litigants throughout the United States. By the end
of the 1960s, this patchwork of uneven state court protections had
led to a perhaps predictable race to the bottom.419
The situation eventually compelled President Nixon to
convene a bi-partisan commission of experts to study and make
recommendations on the apparent breakdown of state-based
workers’ compensation.420
The National Commission
unanimously reported that:
The inescapable conclusion is that State workmen’s
compensation laws in general are inadequate and

418. Id.at 914-15 (internal citation omitted).
419. See infra note 423.
420. The commission was established in Section 27 of the newly enacted
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. John F. Burton, Jr., The National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws: Some Reflections by the Former
Chairman, 40 IAIABC J. 15, 15-16 (2003).
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inequitable. The report listed nineteen “essential
recommendations,” all of which focused on expanding
benefits to workers: eight recommendations dealt with
expanded coverage; nine with increased disability
benefits; and two with improvements to medical and
rehabilitation benefits.
Based on an insurance
industry analysis, the National Commission estimated
that the cost of those expanded benefits would mean
that the average employer would pay 1.5% of payroll
(up from 1.1%) toward workers’ compensation
insurance. The Commission predicted that these
increased benefits would raise total insurance costs
less than 50% in the vast majority of states.421
During the course of the following decade:
[M]ost states enacted legislation liberalizing benefits
to workers—perhaps partly in response to the
Commission’s
recommendation
that
workers’
compensation should be federalized if states failed to
expand benefits. Average state compliance increased
from a level of 6.8 out of the nineteen “essential
recommendations” in 1972 to an average of 12.1 in
1982, when the national trend toward expansion
appeared to level off substantially short of the
recommended goals.422
An expanding opt-out movement reveals a pendulum that
has once again swung wildly in the opposite direction. It can
hardly be wondered why tort and workers’ compensation
modifications, and responses to those modifications, move in
waves. In sum, no stabilizing legal consensus across states as to
the importance of personal injury rights has emerged. Vacillation
seems at once moral and economic. Our pocketbooks direct
elected representatives to rein in business costs as aggressively
as possible. Our moral sensibility periodically intervenes and we
perceive the crudity of a sweeping directive. Unsurprisingly, in
the face of the 1960s workers’ compensation race to the bottom,
the National Commission seriously entertained the need for
federal intervention if states did not voluntarily enact adequate
systems.423 Opt-out does not suggest a commitment to adequacy.
421. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 684 (1998).
422. Id.
423. David B. Torrey, The Federalization/Federal Standards Issue: A Short
History Before and After NFIB v. Sebelius (U.S. 2012), 6 ABA WORKERS’ COMP.
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V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
An additional potential check on the power of states to
severely interfere with the right of an individual to a remedy for
invasions of personal security through mechanisms such as
workers’ compensation opt-out is the federal due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment: “nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .
“424 In addition to imposing procedural restraints on states in
connection with deprivations of life, liberty, or property,425 the
Supreme Court has established that the clause may apply to the
substance of state law touching various rights.426 The perennial
question has been, which state rights are delimited by the
clause?427 And, the Court has vacillated between a narrow and
broader vision of the scope of the clause.428 In present day, the
Court seems to have settled upon an historical “rooting” of the
clause’s meaning and application.429
This Part will first discuss a federal quid pro quo conception
of due process and will contend that the Supreme Court has failed
to discredit quid pro quo despite having ample opportunity to do
so. Subpart B. will proceed to discuss the implications of a still
viable federal quid pro quo theory. Subpart C. will then juxtapose
quid pro quo with “historical” due process analysis.430 Subpart D.
concludes by arguing that the right to a remedy for personal
injury is important and strongly implied by both the structure and
the social contract nature of our legal system and, therefore,
should be recognized as protected by notions of structural due
process.

SECTIONS 2013 MIDWINTER SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE (2013), citing MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL
Insurance 86 (1999).
424. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
425. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
426. See generally Rochin v. People of Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952).
427. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process after Gonzales v. Carhart, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (2008).
428. Id. at 1518.
429. Id. (Noting that historical due process had purported to limit substantive due
process to only those rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition and
contending that the Supreme Court has been returning to such a position).
430. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
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A. FEDERAL QUID PRO QUO
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court, when
upholding workers’ compensation statutes in the twentieth
century, appeared to assume the necessity of quid pro quo—that
common law tort rights could not be displaced unless replaced by
reasonable or adequate substitutes.431 However, in Duke Power
Co.,432 decided in 1978, the nuclear power industry persuaded
Congress to place a cap on damages resulting from any future
catastrophic nuclear accident in the amount of 560 million dollars
per incident.433 Of the number of challenges that the plaintiffs in
Duke Power made to the cap, they argued that such a limitation
of liability violated federal substantive due process.434 The
Supreme Court, in rejecting the due process claim,435 stated, “it is
not all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the
recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute
remedy.”436
Duke Power involved preemption of state law by federal
atomic power policy where the risk of injury was remote.437 It was
generally understood that, in the event of a catastrophic nuclear
incident, victims’ losses would ultimately be underwritten by the
U.S. Government;438 there was no genuine question of injury
benefit elimination.439 The circumstances were unique and
431. See supra Part IV. B.
432. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
433. The Court stated:
In its original form, the Act limited the aggregate liability for a
single nuclear incident to $500 million plus the amount of liability
insurance available on the private market—some $60 million in
1957. The nuclear industry was required to purchase the maximum
available amount of privately underwritten public liability
insurance, and the Act provided that if damages from a nuclear
disaster exceeded the amount of that private insurance coverage,
the Federal Government would indemnify the licensee and other
“persons indemnified” in an amount not to exceed $500 million.
Thus, the actual ceiling on liability was the amount of private
insurance coverage plus the Government’s indemnification
obligation which totaled $560 million.
Id. at 64-65.
434. Id. at 82-93.
435. Id.at 87-91.
436. Id. at 88.
437. Id. at 92-93.
438. Id. at 63-64.
439. See infra notes 442-48 and accompanying text.
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distinguishable from a broad, state-law swap of tort for workers’
compensation rights and from the wholesale abrogation of a wellestablished right by a legislature. Despite this dissimilarity, it is
hard to escape the impression that the Court was subjecting the
Price-Anderson Act440 to heightened scrutiny. Indeed, the Court
cited with approval and explicitly contended that Duke Power was
consistent with White:
The logic of [White] would seem to apply with renewed
force in the context of this challenge to the PriceAnderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act not only
provides a reasonable, prompt, and equitable
mechanism for compensating victims of a catastrophic
nuclear incident, it also guarantees a level of net
compensation generally exceeding that recoverable in
private litigation. Moreover, the Act contains an
explicit congressional commitment to take further
action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event
that the $560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded.
This panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the
least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law
rights replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Nothing
more is required by the Due Process Clause.441
This rhetoric does not have the feel of a “rational basis”
opinion extolling the virtues of legislative supremacy. On the
contrary, the language seems quite justificatory. At the very
least, it seems difficult to draw from the “reasonably just
substitute” language a conclusion that the Court once and for all
had slammed the door on quid pro quo due process analyses.
Seven years following Duke Power, the Court denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, discussed earlier in this Article.442
The petition
challenged, on federal due process grounds, caps on medical
malpractice liability in connection with noneconomic damages.443
As may be recalled, the California Supreme Court specifically
rejected the existence of a quid pro quo due process theory.444
Justice Stevens dissented to the dismissal, contending that the
Court had never decided the federal quid pro quo issue:
440. Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act), 42
U.S.C. ch. 23 (1957).
441. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93.
442. See supra notes 362-71 and accompanying text.
443. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1985).
444. Id. at 679-81, n. 18.

DUFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

STATE’S AUTHORITY TO OPT-OUT

10/22/2016 9:39 AM

189

Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted
compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the
common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so,
how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue
unresolved by this Court, and one which is dividing
the appellate and highest courts of several States. The
issue is important, and is deserving of this Court’s
review. Moreover, given the continued national
concern over the “malpractice crisis,” it is likely that
more States will enact similar types of limitations, and
that the issue will recur. I find, therefore, that the
federal question presented by this appeal is
substantial, and dissent from the Court’s conclusion to
the contrary.445
Although it might be argued that the dismissal decided the
quid pro quo issue,446 it does not appear that the Court has
thereafter had occasion to address quid pro quo; nor has the issue
been discussed in the federal court as if it had been resolved. If
White is dead, neither Duke Power nor Fein Permanente could
have killed it.
It has been well-argued that the quid pro quo test can be
inflexible, that it can fail to distinguish clearly between floor and
ceiling challenges to reform, or to help courts in distinguishing
precisely between particular kinds of tort reforms.447 Yet there
seems little doubt that quid pro quo is routinely discussed when
courts become uncomfortable with threats to obviously important
rights.
445. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 474 U.S. 892, 894-95 (1985).
446. The Court has held that “[S]ummary dismissals are of course, to be taken as
rulings on the merits, in the sense that they rejected the ‘specific challenges presented
in the statement of jurisdiction’ and left ‘undisturbed the judgment appealed from.’”
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 476 n.20 (1979) (internal citation omitted). Summary dismissals do not, however,
have the same precedential value as does an opinion of the Court after briefing and
oral argument on the merits. Neely v. Newton, 149 F.3d 1074, 1079 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“The Supreme Court has cautioned that for purposes of determining the binding effect
of a summary action, the action should not be interpreted as adopting the rationale of
the lower court, but rather as affirming only the judgment of that court.”). “Summary
affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt
reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction.” Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). And, “[t]hey do prevent lower courts from coming
to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by
those actions.” Id. “[I]f the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains
so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344 (1975).
447. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 613.
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B. RAMIFICATIONS OF A STILL-ALIVE QUID PRO QUO:
REVISITING OPT-OUT
If workers’ compensation opt-out is recast as personal injury
opt-out, the quid pro quo issue is whether courts will allow
legislatures to grant private injurers tort immunity, and whether
such an arrangement is a “reasonably just” substitute for tort
rights. The Supreme Court has hinted at the ceiling of the Due
Process Clause in quid pro quo contexts:
The Prince-Anderson Act not only provides a
reasonable, prompt, and equitable mechanism for
compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear
incident, it also guarantees a level of net compensation
generally exceeding that recoverable in private
litigation. Moreover, the Act contains an explicit
congressional commitment to take further action to
aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event that the
$560 million ceiling on liability is exceeded. This
panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the least a
reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights
replaced by the Price-Anderson Act. Nothing more is
required by the Due Process Clause.448
If that is the ceiling, the question is where this leaves the
floor of quid pro quo. Opt-out “alternative benefit plans” appear
to set no floor.449 There is no requirement that the plans pay any
minimum level of benefits.450 In Oklahoma, alternative plans are
required to pay the same “forms” of benefits as those required
under the workers’ compensation statute.451 The statute requires
payment of specified benefits for total disability, for partial
disability, and for medical treatment.452 In Tennessee, critics
allege that the proposed opt-out bill, S.B. 721,453 leaves critical
substantive workers’ compensation decisions exclusively within
the discretion of employers: coverage of medical expenses,
selection of medical providers, deciding whether to end or
448. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93.
449. See Letter to Senator Sherrod Brown (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 24, 2016) (“ERISA
does not give the Department [of Labor] the authority to establish adequacy levels for
benefits
in
[opt-out]
plans.”)
(last
accessed
July
12,
2016),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2730159-DOL-ERISA-Opt-Out-Letter022416.html.
450. Id.
451. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 203(B).
452. See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, §§ 1-125 (West 2015).
453. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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continue benefits, and whether to attempt dispute resolution.454
No appeal of eligibility determinations is mentioned anywhere in
the bill.455 Thus, the bill would apparently not confer plan
participants with rights to contest substantive determinations
under an alternative benefit plan.456 Additionally, no procedures
for dispute resolution are set forth in the bill, and no procedures
for selection of claim dispute factfinders are identified.457 Unlike
the Oklahoma statute,458 the Tennessee bill would not retain the
workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule,459 but the right to
recover under Tennessee tort law would apparently be modified
under the bill.460 No right to sue would exist if the employee
“[fails] to follow instructions and rules,” is injured by “hazards
that are commonly known and appreciated, or if the injury is
caused by “failure to follow available safe alternatives.”461 Thus,
employers would be afforded several affirmative defenses,
seemingly of the type that formed the original rationale for states
adopting workers’ compensation in the first place.462
In a detailed study of Texas alternative benefit plans,
Professor Alison Morantz found that, although employees did not
have to go through benefit waiting periods under the plans they
faced other obstacles to recovering benefits:
Yet in other respects—for example, the commonplace
twenty-four-hour reporting deadlines, absence of
employee choice over medical providers, absence of
any permanent partial or permanent total disability
coverage, and prevalent caps on total benefits—such
plan appeared less favorable to employees. Moreover,
presumably in an effort to curb tort liability, a very
high fraction (about 85 percent) of nonsubscriber plans
channeled disputes to mandatory arbitration. Not
454. David B. Torrey, Appendix B: Statement of The American Insurance
Association, supra note 74, at 36.
455. See generally S B. 721, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015).
456. The bill does not provide for internal review of determinations and likely
contemplates that all actions for non-negligent breach will be brought under ERISA.
See generally S. B. 721, 190th Gen. Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015).
457. Id.
458. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60-85A, § 209(A) (West 2015).
459. S. B. 721 § 50-10-108, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015).
460. Economic damages would apparently be capped at $1,000,000 per employee.
S.B. 721 § 50-10-108(b)(1), 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015),
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf (last accessed July 12, 2016).
461. S.B. 721 § 50-10-108(c)(4-7), 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015),
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Bill/SB0721.pdf (last accessed Aug. 12, 2016).
462. See DUFF, supra note 23, at 6.
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only did virtually all companies deem their programs
to be a success and report cost savings, but most were
pleasantly surprised by the magnitude of these
savings, which reportedly exceeded (on average) 50
percent across all industries.463
Thus, under the alternative plans analyzed by Professor
Morantz, entire classifications of the most seriously injured
workers were not eligible for permanent disability benefits and—
if they had signed on to an arbitration agreement as a condition
of participating in such a plan—could also not pursue a tort
claim.464 If it is a constitutional requirement under federal quid
pro quo due process for a state legislature to provide a reasonable
alternative to a tort remedy, opt-out might have a very difficult
time surviving heightened judicial scrutiny.
C. QUID PRO QUO AND HISTORICALLY-ROOTED RIGHTS
Quid Pro Quo may possibly be understood as an inchoate type
of historical due process analysis.
The original workers’
compensation grand bargain was understood as a swap of
important rights465 and was historical in at least two senses.
First, the swap itself is over a century old466 and has, therefore,
itself become an important part of history and tradition. Second,
the implication behind the bargain is that only a reasonable set of
rights could be substituted for a tort-based right to a remedy for
personal injury; a right that is difficult not to see through
Blackstonian lenses.467

463. Alison Morantz, Opting out of Workers’ Compensation in Texas: A Survey of
Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, Regulation vs. Litig. Perspectives from Econs. And
Law 197 200 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010). The respondents in the study reported high
satisfaction with the magnitude of their cost savings. They were clearly winners under
the system. Frankly, it seems a bit pointless to discuss how the plans may be better
than workers’ compensation in some respects once it is understood that they eliminate
permanent benefits. That qualification dwarfs everything else. It is also true, however,
that Texas had variable injury expenses until about fifteen years ago, despite
operating an opt-out system. Then costs began to descend. See id. at 201-02. Although
the reasons for this are not yet clear, it is hard to ignore the Supreme Court’s
intervening application of compulsory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act
to employment in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001).
464. After all, it is the most seriously injured workers who are permanently
disabled, and those are the claims explicitly excluded by these alternative plans.
465. See supra Part II.
466. Id.
467. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 545.
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In Washington v. Glucksberg,468 Chief Justice Rehnquist
articulated what has become a common formulation in the
Supreme Court’s historical substantive due process doctrine:
[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specifically protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”
Second, we have required in substantive-due-process
cases a “careful description” of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.469
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,470 a dissenting Justice
Breyer warned against “the reefs and shoals that lie in wait for
those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight
upon historical considerations.”471 Nevertheless, it seems difficult
to avoid exploration of the historical dimensions of personal injury
remedies in light of Glucksberg and its progeny.472 The inquiry
resembles this article’s state law “right to a remedy” discussion.473
The heart of the matter is whether the right to a remedy for
personal injury—a right to redress—is “fundamental” or even
important. If it is difficult to identify an explicitly deeply-rooted
historical right to a remedy for personal injury (within or outside
a workplace) the matter can hardly be said to be resolved because:
[T]he most fundamental rights are those that no
government of the people would contemplate
abridging—it is doubtful that many courts or
legislatures have discussed whether the government
can determine whether we are allowed to breathe air,
but this does not make our access to oxygen any less
grounded in history.474
More to the point, the entire discussion of quid pro quo in
White underscores that, at least at a certain juncture in history,
the Supreme Court has likely suspected that right to a remedy for

468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 720-21 (internal quotation omitted) (internal citations omitted).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Id. at 916 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 92 (2006).
473. See infra Part IV. A.
474. Abigail Alliance For Better Access v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 722 (D.C.
Cir. 207) (en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

DUFF (DO NOT DELETE)

194

10/22/2016 9:39 AM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17.2

physical injury was of heightened importance. Whether that
sense of importance was from the due process clause or from
elsewhere in the Fourteenth Amendment is difficult to say. The
architects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and
immunities clause, for example, had the benefit of Justice
Bushrod Washington’s 1823 interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution in Corfield v.
Coryell.475 In Corfield,476 plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey
statute forbidding out of state persons from gathering clams and
oysters.477 Justice Washington rejected the claim that the law ran
afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation
in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign.
What these
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following
general heads: Protection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.478
Whether John Bingham, a principal author of the Fourteenth
Amendment,479 consciously presumed during the drafting of the
Amendment that the right to “obtain safety”480 was a “privilege
and immunity”481 of citizens is beyond the scope of this
discussion.482 It nevertheless seems plain enough, historically
475. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City
of Chicago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad
Thing For Rights, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 589-90 (2011).
476. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (Pa. E.D. 1823).
477. Id. at 548.
478. Id. at 551-52.
479. Jackson, supra note 475, at 589.
480. Id. at 590.
481. Id. at 589.
482. Id.
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speaking, that colonists, founders, and republicans would have
recognized a right to a remedy for personal injury.483 However,
substantive due process runs deeper than history.
In McDonald, the Supreme Court struck municipal handgun
restrictions, extending Heller’s reach to the states.484 Although
not willing to broaden the cramped view of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (established in
the Slaughterhouse cases),485 Justice Alito ultimately opined that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms.486 His opinion, in many
respects, mirrors arguments made in the state courts regarding
the historical grounding of tort law and the right to a remedy for
physical injury.487
The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by
state constitutions at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. In 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state
constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep
and bear arms. Quite a few of these state constitutional
guarantees, moreover, explicitly protected the right to keep and
bear arms as an individual right to self-defense. What is more,
state constitutions adopted during the Reconstruction era by
former Confederate States included a right to keep and bear arms.
A clear majority of the States in 1868, therefore, recognized the
right to keep and bear arms as being among the foundational
rights necessary to our system of Government. In sum, it is clear
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.488
In response to this familiar historical stratagem—attempting
to establish that a right was recognized as fundamental during
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, should
483.
484.
485.
486.

See Goldberg, supra note 33, at 545, 551.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Id. at 750.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking District of
Columbia’s gun restrictions).
487. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749-50.
488. Id. at 758 (citing Calabresi & Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 50 (2008)). See
Ala. Const., Art. I, § 28 (1868); Conn. Const., Art. I, § 17 (1818); Ky. Const., Art. XIII,
§ 25 (1850); Mich. Const., Art. XVIII, § 7 (1850); Miss. Const. Art. I, § 15 (1868); Mo.
Const., Art. I, § 8 (1865); Tex. Const., Art. I, § 13 (1869). See also Mont. Const., Art.
III, § 13 (1889); Wash. Const., Art. I, § 24 (1889); Wyo. Const., Art. I, § 24 (188). See
also State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986).
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be considered fundamental in present times489—Justice Stevens
replied:
More fundamentally, a rigid historical methodology is
unfaithful to the Constitution’s command. For if it
were really the case that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights “so
rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to
require special protection,” then the guarantee would
serve little function, save to ratify those rights that
state actors have already been according the most
extensive protection. That approach is unfaithful to
the expansive principle Americans laid down when
they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the
level of generality they chose when they crafted its
language; it promises an objectivity it cannot deliver
and masks the value judgments that pervade any
analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are
sufficiently “rooted”; it countenances the most
revolting injustices in the name of continuity, for we
must never forget that not only slavery but also the
subjugation of women and other rank forms of
discrimination are part of our history; and it effaces
this Court’s distinctive role in saying what the law is,
leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to
majoritarian political processes.
It is judicial
abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.490
This is where historical analyses often end. One side (it is
unimportant which side) will argue that an important right,
though undeniably important, is not sufficiently valued within
the text of the Constitution to warrant careful protection.491 The
other side will retort that the right under discussion has been
effectively protected against infringement by the states and “is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”492 As is the case in state
law contexts already considered, in the absence of a constitutional
amendment or of the occasional change of perspective of a key
Supreme Court Justice, there is little more to say once a mode of
historical analysis has been decided upon.493 In the context of the
489. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767-69.
490. Id. at 875-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
491. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), rev’d on other
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
492. Id. at 325.
493. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-
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workers’ compensation quid pro quo, it is unclear whether
historical analysis was at the root of the Supreme Court’s view
that tort could not be supplanted without substitution of a
reasonably just substitute. It is certainly possible that the Court
may have found the tort right deserving of due process protection
irrespective of its historical significance; however, some work is
required to accept such a conclusion.
D. STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS, LOCKEAN PROVISOS, AND
MCDONALD
No just legal system could conclude that the right to a remedy
for personal injury—particularly, for physical injury—is subject
to significant modification or eradication on the whim of a
legislature. However, workers’ compensation opt-out carries the
potential for eradicating both an underlying tort right and the
derivative workers’ compensation right. In a similar vein,
incremental erosion of workers’ compensation rights continually
creates the potential for inadequate remediation of injured
workers. Following John Goldberg, this Article contends that:
[I]t might be helpful to conceive of the right to a law of
redress as one of a special set of due process rights that
entitle individuals to certain governmental structures
and certain bodies of law. If this notion of structural
due process is sound, it will encompass more than just
tort law, understood as a law for the redress of wrongs.
Contract, criminal, family, and property law likewise
seem plausible for candidates for inclusion.494
As Goldberg has further argued, a structural due process
theory can provide a framework for connecting areas of private
and public law.495 The argument for elevating the right to a
remedy for personal injury is not a mechanical appeal to either
natural law or to explicit constitutional text. Rather, it involves
an assessment of what our legal tradition has in fact valued over
the centuries. To say to the factory worker that the right to
pursue a remedy for the loss of an arm may be dispensed with
whenever a legislature believes a reasonable remedy would be too
expensive is unacceptable on an almost primordial level. Indeed,
72 (2003) (striking a Texas same-sex sodomy law and, with respect to historical
analysis, stating, “[i]n all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half
century are of most relevance here.”)
494. Goldberg, supra note 33, at 625.
495. Id.
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it raises questions as to whether individuals would, in the original
position, assent to such a social arrangement. The idea of
structural due process centers on intuitions about the nature of
this original social arrangement.
Goldberg suggests the
structural due process right as potentially:
[U]nderstood as an individual entitlement to certain
political institutions, operating in accordance with
certain norms or principles. The right to a vote that
takes place under appropriate conditions, one might
argue, is a guarantee of structure of the same sort as
the right to a law for the redress of private wrongs,
and the right to a government of separated powers.496
However, it must be said, respectfully, that this formulation
unnecessarily dances around the primacy of the right to personal,
physical security. People who have routinely been exposed to
physical danger have no reason to question the importance of
physical security. The importance of such a right can be vague
only to those who are routinely secure.
It is evident that our legal tradition does, in fact, value and
protect such a right to personal security. One does not have to
accept the view that only rights deeply-rooted in a formal
historical sense count as “important” to acknowledge with implicit
historical evidence what our legal system has valued. Steven
Calabresi and Sarah Agudo have found, for example, that in 1868,
two-thirds of state constitutions had provisions guaranteeing
unenumerated inalienable, natural, or inherent rights, and have
used the term “Lockean Natural Rights” to refer to those rights.497
Justice Alito relied on Calabresi and Agudo’s work in
McDonald,498 and it is evident that the Court has now accepted
the existence of unenumerated rights.499
The Lockean
characterization of these rights is traceable to George Mason’s
authorship in the original draft of the Virginia Constitution’s Bill
of Rights.500 For purposes of this article, two of Mason’s early
drafts of this language will suffice to illustrate the importance of
security to the Framers.
Record of Mason’s Lockean theory of government is first
496. Id.
497. Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees,
93 TEX. L. REV. 1299 (2015).
498. Id. at 1302.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 1314.
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uncovered in a transcript of his Remarks on Annual Elections for
the Fairfax Independent Company in 1775,501 one year prior to the
1776 adoption of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.502 The main
point of the remarks was that the Fairfax Independent Company
should hold annual elections for its militia officers.503 Mason
elaborated considerably as follows:
We came equals into this world, and equals shall we
go out of it. All men are by nature born equally free
and independent. To protect the weaker from the
injuries and insults of the stronger were societies first
formed; when men entered into compacts to give up
some of their natural rights, that by union and mutual
assistance they might secure the rest; but they gave
up no more than the nature of the thing required.
Every society, all government, and every kind of civil
compact therefore, is or ought to be, calculated for the
general good and safety of the community. Every
power, every authority vested in particular men is, or
ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end; and
whenever any power or authority whatever extends
further, or is of longer duration than is in its nature
necessary for these purposes, it may be called
government, but it is in fact oppression.504
Then, in 1776, Mason submitted his first draft of similar
language for the Virginia “Lockean Rights” constitutional
guarantee.505 The language states:
That all Men are born equally free and independant
[sic], and have certain inherent natural Rights, of
which they can not by any Compact, deprive or divest
their Posterity; among which are the Enjoyment of
Life and Liberty, with the Means of acquiring and
possessing Property, and pursueing [sic] and
obtaining Happiness and Safety.506
In each formulation, the right to safety is mentioned.507 This

501.
502.
503.
504.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing George Mason, Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax
Independent Company (Apr. 17-26, 1775), in 1 The Papers of George Mason, 1725-92
(Robert A Rutland ed., 1970)).
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1315.
507. Id. at 1305-06.
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seems unsurprising since in 1765 Blackstone discussed “personal
security” as first among the “absolute rights” of the English law
of that time.508
The purpose of this foray into history is not to say it should
be “cited” because it is history, but rather, because it is correct. It
is nearly impossible to suppose that any person would consciously
enter into a society that denies remedy for physical injury caused
by wrongful conduct. While McDonald protects one aspect of
personal security—physical self-defense through firearms509—it
is much to be hoped that substantive due process might equally
provide self-defense through utilization of those processes
rendering resort to arms less necessary.510 That seems the more
fitting ideal of self-defense for a civilized society. At the end of the
day, many people will suffer injury in the workplace. It is true
that a number of those injuries will be truly accidental and would
not have been remedied under the law of negligence; yet it is
equally clear that many injuries will have resulted from the
negligence of an employer. It is unacceptable and violative of
structural due process that the American legal system could leave
those injured employees without a reasonable remedy for injury.
However, that is exactly what both opt-out and the continuous
erosion of workers’ compensation benefits threaten.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident that an opt-out movement seeks to persuade
states to substantially immunize employers within their borders
from legal liability for workplace injuries. Such a design would
mark a decisive break with the quid pro quo grand bargain of the
early twentieth century. Whether this movement will ultimately
succeed depends in large part on the number of state judiciaries
willing to interpret state constitutions as not providing a right to
a remedy for personal injury. Many judiciaries are unlikely to
allow such a dramatic encroachment on what has been
understood in many states to be an important, if not fundamental,
right. However, there is a risk of some states getting caught up
508. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (George
Chase, 2d ed. 1884).
509. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767-68 (2010).
510. Alito’s conception of self-defense is essentially “pre-political.” We lay down our
arms with the expectation that society will provide mechanisms of protection. At that
point it is only when the state fails to protect us that resort to self-defense becomes
morally justifiable. See Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82
PAC. PHIL. Q. 332, 357-58 (2001).
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in a “race to the bottom,” where states not recognizing a right to
a remedy for physical injury become havens of low-cost labor and,
thus, exert pressure on states that safeguard traditional rights to
follow suit.
Throughout this Article, workers’ compensation has been
discussed in tandem with tort remedies for personal, and
especially physical, injuries. The discussion has, in reality, been
a broader reflection on the limits of tort reform. Whether the
particular context in such a conversation is products liability,
medical malpractice, statutes of repose, or workers’
compensation, the underlying issue is the limits of legislative
discretion in reducing personal injury remedies. Opt-out is simply
the most recent social consideration of who will bear losses
occasioned by physical injury. However, opt-out crosses a line not
often crossed in earlier tort reform debates. It is one thing to say
that noneconomic damages may be capped. It is quite another to
say that the right to economic damages may be significantly
circumscribed. To understand the radical nature of the project it
must be constantly remembered that workers’ compensation
already represents a significant compromise by workers of
economic damages. An entire range of compensatory damages is
simply not available as a result of the Grand Bargain. A century
ago, workers had already completely surrendered noneconomic
damages. Many states struggle politically over the adequacy of
benefits provided to injured workers. As with Florida, credible
arguments can be made that inadequate benefits represent, as a
practical matter, breach of the quid pro quo. Opt-out, without
question, completely breaks the Bargain.
Without a legal guarantee of some level of benefits for
specified degrees of incapacity, opt-out is not any kind of legal
substitute for tort. The question White was able to defer is
presented in the full light of day: “it perhaps may be doubted
whether the state could abolish all rights of action, on the one
hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and
we intimate no opinion upon it.”511 The Court may now be forced
to intimate an opinion upon such abolishment and its
jurisprudence may not be up to the task, though Lockean provisos
be thrown by the wayside. If the Court does not intervene, one
can anticipate renewed debates about the advisability of muscular
federalization of workers’ compensation as cost-shifts ruble

511. New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1912).
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through the economy. If workers’ compensation does not pay the
costs associated with injured workers, something or someone else
will. In that event, privatization of public law will have completed
its march through the domain of employment law and into the
very heart of structural due process.

